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Abstract
This paper examines the impact of vouchers in general and voucher design in particular on public
school performance. It argues that all voucher programs are not created equal. There are often funda-
mental dierences in voucher designs that aect public school incentives dierently and induce dierent
responses from them. It analyzes two voucher programs in the U.S. The 1990 Milwaukee experiment
can be looked upon as a \voucher shock" program that suddenly made low-income students eligible for
vouchers. The 1999 Florida program can be looked upon as a \threat of voucher" program, where schools
getting an \F" grade for the rst time are exposed to the threat of vouchers, but do not face vouchers
unless and until they get a second \F" within the next three years. In the context of a formal theo-
retical model, the study argues that the threatened public schools will unambiguously improve under
the Florida-type program and this improvement will exceed that under the Milwaukee-type program.
Using school-level scores from Florida and Wisconsin, and a dierence-in-dierences estimation strategy
in trends, it then shows that these predictions are validated empirically.
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The 1983 report \A Nation at Risk"1 and a series of similar reports have led to continued concern that
American public schools may be lagging behind their counterparts in other parts of the developed world.
This has led to a wave of demands for public school reform. School choice and accountability in general, and
vouchers in particular, are among the most hotly debated instruments of public school reform. This paper is
motivated by the need to understand the eect of vouchers and, in particular, the designs of dierent kinds
of vouchers on public school performance. It argues that all voucher programs are not created equal. There
are often fundamental dierences in voucher designs that aect public school incentives dierently and in
turn bring about dierent responses from them.
The last decade has seen three publicly funded voucher experiments in the U.S. The rst was initiated
in Milwaukee in 1990. This was followed by Cleveland in 1996 and Florida in 1999. Interestingly, there are
crucial dierences in the designs of these programs. The Milwaukee and Cleveland experiments are similar.
(In the rest of the paper, I will concentrate on the Milwaukee experiment.2) These two experiments can be
looked upon as \voucher shock" programs with a sudden government announcement that the low-income
public school population is eligible for vouchers. In particular, starting in the 1990-91 school year, the
Milwaukee Parental Choice Program (MPCP) makes all public school students with family income at or
below 175% of the poverty line eligible for vouchers to attend non-sectarian private schools.
On the other hand, the Florida program, also known as the Opportunity Scholarship program, makes all
students of a public school eligible for vouchers or \opportunity scholarships" if the school gets two \F"3
grades in a period of four years. Thus the Florida program can be looked upon as a \threat of voucher", rather
than a \voucher shock" program. Here the failing schools are rst threatened with vouchers and vouchers
are implemented only if they fail to meet a government designated cuto quality level. In particular, a school
getting an \F" for the rst time is exposed to the threat of vouchers but does not face vouchers unless and
until it gets a second \F" within the next three years.4 This paper argues that these dierences in voucher
1 National Commission of Excellence in Education (1983),\A Nation at Risk: The Imperative for Educational Reform,"
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Oce.
2 I will focus on the Milwaukee experiment up to 1996-97. This is because following a 1998 Wisconsin Supreme Court ruling,
there were some major changes and the program entered into its second phase in 1998-99. Moreover, comparable test score
data are available only up to 1996-97.
3 The Florida Department of Education classies schools according to ve grades: - A, B, C, D, F (A-highest, F-lowest).
4 In 1999, 78 schools got an \F". Students in 2 of those schools became eligible for vouchers. No school became eligible for
vouchers in 2000 or 2001 although 4 elementary schools got an F in 2000. In 2002, 64 schools got an F. Students in 10 of those
schools became eligible for vouchers.
1designs will aect public school incentives dierently and will induce very dierent responses from them. In
particular, it argues that the Florida type \threat of voucher" program will induce a much greater public
school response than the Milwaukee type \voucher shock" program.
Apart from the above dierences, the designs of the two programs are strikingly similar. In both the
experiments, the private schools are not permitted, by law, to discriminate between students who apply
with vouchers{they have to accept all students unless oversubscribed and have to pick students randomly
once they are oversubscribed. The system of funding is also very similar. Under each program the average
voucher amount equals the state aid per pupil, and the vouchers are nanced by an equivalent reduction of
state aid to the district. Thus state funding is directly tied to student enrollment and enrollment losses due
to vouchers are reected in a revenue loss for the public school. The average voucher amounts under the
Florida (1999-2000 through 2001-2002) and Milwaukee (1990-1991 through 1996-1997) programs have been
respectively $3,330 and $3,346. The corresponding revenue loss per student as a percentage of total revenue
per pupil has been 41.66% in Florida and 45.23% in Milwaukee during this period.
The paper develops its argument in the context of a formal theoretical model with three agents: { the
public school, which aims at maximizing net revenue (which I call \rent"); the households, which care about
school quality; and the private schools, which are represented by exogenously given quality levels. The
demand for public school is endogenously determined from household behavior, giving micro-foundations
to the public school payo function. In an equilibrium framework, the model endogenously determines
public school quality and its ingredients { public school eort and peer group quality. Both under complete
information and under moral hazard (when public school eort is not observable), the model generates two
empirically testable predictions that hold at the respective program equilibria { the threatened public schools
will show an unambiguous improvement in quality under the Florida-type \threat of voucher" program and
the improvement under the \threat of voucher" program will exceed that under the Milwaukee-type \voucher
shock" program.
Using school-level test score data from Florida and Wisconsin, the paper next proceeds to test the two
theoretical predictions. Implementing a dierence-in-dierences estimation strategy in trends, it estimates
the program eects for each of the experiments by comparing the post-program improvement of the treated
schools with an appropriate set of control schools. Controlling for potentially confounding pre-program
time trends and post-program common shocks, the paper nds considerable evidence in favor of both the
2theoretical predictions. These ndings are quite robust in that they continue to hold after controlling for
other confounding factors such as mean reversion. Several strategies, including a regression discontinuity
estimation strategy, are used to address the potential problem of mean reversion.
Although the main motivation for writing this paper is to highlight how dierences in voucher designs can
have radically dierent eects on public school incentives and performance, there is another motivation that
is no less important. It is very dicult to empirically quantify the pure public school response to vouchers
or even to determine its direction. On the one hand, vouchers aect public school quality directly through
public school response; on the other, vouchers lead to sorting which aects public school quality through
changes in student composition and the public school peer group.5 All these three factors are reected in the
observable public school outcome - school scores. Therefore an empirical analysis of school scores captures
a combination of all these factors rather than the pure public school eect. As a result, we would ideally
want an experiment where the only response to vouchers is from the public school and there is no sorting,
and consequently no eect on student composition or peer group. The Florida program, to a large extent,
provides such a case. In Florida, the schools threatened by vouchers respond by optimizing on eort, but
there is no sorting if the school manages to avoid another \F". Therefore, an empirical analysis of the
improvement of these schools promises to provide an idea about the direction and magnitude of the pure
public school response.
The main theoretical studies relevant to this paper are Epple and Romano (1998) and McMillan (2001).
Epple and Romano look at the eect of vouchers on the choice between public and private schools. They
argue that vouchers lead to sorting by income and ability. However, they take public schools as passive
and thus abstract from the incentive eects of vouchers on public school response. McMillan models public
school behavior. He shows that under certain circumstances, public schools may nd it optimal to reduce
productivity when a voucher is introduced. There are some important dierences between his paper and
this study. The main dierence is that he considers the eect of traditional voucher experiments (\voucher
shock" in my terminology) on public school response. On the other hand, this paper compares and contrasts
the eects of two types of voucher experiments { a \voucher shock" and a \threat of voucher" on public
school performance. Second, this paper derives the demand for public school from equilibrium household
behavior, thus providing micro-foundations to the public school payo function, unlike McMillan. Third,
5 See Hsieh and Urquiola (2003)
3since households dier only by income in McMillan's model, he is unable to model peer-group quality.6 In
this paper, households are characterized by an income-ability tuple. Peer-group quality is endogenously
determined which enables me to examine the eect of vouchers on peer group quality and explicitly model
the interactions of peer-group quality, household choices, and public school choice.
A number of empirical studies look at the eect of vouchers on the performance of students who move
to private schools with vouchers (the \choice students"). There are three such studies in the context of
Milwaukee. Witte et al. (1995) nd no evidence of any eect; Greene et al. (1996) nd positive eects
in both reading and math, while Rouse (1998) nds positive eect in math, but no eect in reading for
Milwaukee choice students. Surprisingly, only two studies thus far look at the eect of vouchers on public
school performance in the U.S.. Greene (2001) looks at the eect of the Florida program while Hoxby
(2001) looks at the eect of the Milwaukee program after the Supreme Court ruling of 1998. Both studies
nd evidence of a positive productivity response to vouchers. However, both studies use only two years of
data { one pre-program and one post-program year { and hence cannot control for any pre-program trend.
Thus, public school response to vouchers is a relatively neglected area both in the theoretical and empirical
literature. In particular, there is no study thus far (either theoretical or empirical) that seeks to compare
the public school response to dierent voucher designs. This study lls this important gap.
2 The Model
There are three agents in the model: (i) the public school, (ii) the private schools, and (iii) the households.
The public school is free and oers quality (q) to all households that choose to attend it. The quality q is
a composite of two factors: public school eort and public school peer-group quality. The objective of the
public school is to maximize net revenue,7 which I call \rent" in rest of the paper. Rent is simply dened
as revenue minus costs. Public school revenue is given by pN,8 where p is the exogenously given per pupil
6 Since peer group quality is an important ingredient of school quality, understanding the eect on peer group quality is
essential to understanding the eect on school quality.
7 I adhere to the general line of thought in the school competition literature [Hoxby (2001), McMillan (2001)] that the public
school maximizes net revenue. An alternative formulation could be to model the public school as a quality maximizer. However,
in that case there would be no argument for voucher programs as far as improving public school quality is concerned.
8 This formulation captures the fact that revenue is directly tied to the number of students under each of the programs as
well as in the simple public-private (baseline) system. However, as discussed earlier, in both Florida and Milwaukee, the public
school loses only the state aid per pupil for each student lost due to vouchers. Therefore, a more appropriate formulation would
be to model revenue as a more general function of enrollment p(N). For simplicity, I assume a multiplicative form. All results
go through with the more general functional form p(N), p0(N) > 0.
4revenue and N is the number of students in public school. Public school cost (Cp) depends on its eort (e)
and number of students, Cp(N;e) = c(N)+C(e). Both c(:) and C(:) functions are assumed to be increasing
and strictly convex in their respective arguments. I assume p   cN > 0, that is the \net marginal revenue"
per student is positive.
There is a continuum of private schools providing a continuum of quality levels. Each private school is
\passive" and does not take any maximizing decision.9 Households pay a tuition T = tQ (t > 0) to attend
a private school of quality Q.10
Households are characterized by an income-ability tuple (y;), where y 2 [0;1] and  2 [0;1]. y and
 are assumed to be independently and uniformly distributed. A household obtains utility (U) from the
consumption of the numeraire good (x), school quality () and its ability (). The household utility function
is assumed to be continuous and twice dierentiable and is given by U(x;;) = h(x)+u(). The functions
h and u are increasing and strictly concave in x and  respectively. It follows that households with higher
ability have a higher preference (marginal valuation) for school quality, U > 0.11
School qualities available to a household are public school quality and a continuum of (exogenously given)
private school qualities. Public school quality q = q(e;b) is a continuous, twice dierentiable, increasing and
concave function of public school eort e 2 [emin;emax]12 and public school peer quality b. Public school
peer quality is dened as the mean ability of the public school student body.13 If a public school household
decides to switch to a private school with vouchers, it incurs a positive switching or relocation cost c.
The paper models three alternative scenarios: (i) a simple public-private system (PP) without vouchers
(the baseline), which can be thought of as the pre-program scenario for both programs; (ii) the Milwaukee-
type \voucher shock" (VS) program; and (iii) the Florida-type \threat of voucher" (TOV) program. The
simple public-private system consists of two stages. In the rst stage, the public school chooses eort. In
9 This is in keeping with the feature of the U.S. voucher experiments, by which private schools are not allowed to discrim-
inate between students. They have to accept all students unless oversubscribed and have to accept students randomly when
oversubscribed. (Of course, in the voucher experiments, they can choose whether or not to enter. I abstract from that here for
simplicty.)
10 Note that at equilibrium, private school quality will always exceed public school quality. Otherwise, no household would
pay to attend a private school.
11 The assumption U = 0 is made for simplicity. All results go through under U < 0, U < 0 (and thrice dierentia-
bility).
12 Public School eort is assumed to be observable here for simplicity. As appendices B and C show, the results continue to
hold when eort is unobservable, but what is observable is a noisy representation of eort (for example, public school scores).
13 Public school quality can be thought of as being embodied in public school scores. The notion here is that public school
scores reect both public school eort and public school peer-group quality, which in turn depends on the abilities of the public
school students. In other words, both public school characteristics and student characteristics contribute to school scores.
5stage 2, households choose between schools after observing the last stage public school eort.14 Peer-group
quality and public school quality are simultaneously determined.
The Milwaukee program is analyzed in three stages. In the rst stage, the government announces voucher
v. In stage 2, facing v, the public school chooses eort. In stage 3, households choose between schools (after
observing v and e) and incur switching costs if they transfer out of public school. Peer-group quality and
public school quality are simultaneously obtained.
The Florida program is modeled in four stages. In the rst stage, the Government announces the program
and a corresponding cuto quality  q and voucher v. In stage 2, facing the program the public school chooses
eort. Given the existing peer group quality,15 quality q is realized. In stage 3, the government imposes
vouchers v if q <  q. No voucher is imposed if q   q. In the last stage, households choose between schools
(after observing eort and whether vouchers were imposed) and incur switching costs if they transfer out of
public schools. Peer-group quality and public school quality are simultaneously realized.
Each of the systems constitutes a game between two players: the public school and the households. The
TOV program is initiated by a government announcement that all students of a school will be eligible for
vouchers v if it fails to meet a certain quality cuto  q.16 Facing this program, and knowing its existing peer
group quality, the public school deduces the eort level  e that it needs to match to escape vouchers. Facing
this  e cuto, and correctly anticipating household behavior, it chooses eort to maximize rent. Given the
existing peer group quality, quality is realized simultaneously. In stage 3, the government imposes vouchers
or not, as promised, based on the observed quality. In stage 4, based on observed public school eort
and whether vouchers were imposed in stage 3, the households anticipate a certain peer-group quality and
choose between schools. At equilibrium, anticipated peer quality equals actual peer quality. This yields an
equilibrium peer quality and a corresponding allocation of households between public and private sectors.
Equilibrium public school quality (which is a composite of equilibrium public school eort and peer quality)
is simultaneously obtained. Therefore an equilibrium of the \threat of voucher" program is an eort-peer
quality tuple (eTOV ;bTOV ), such that given the quality cuto  q and voucher v (i) eTOV is a public school
equilibrium, given bTOV and (ii) bTOV is a household equilibrium, given eTOV .
14 The general notion in all the three systems is that households observe last year's scores and whether vouchers were given
and then choose between schools.
15 Since the public-private system is the pre-program scenario, the existing peer-group quality is the public-private peer group
quality.
16 Note that since peer group quality and eort are observable, this is equivalent to announcing a cuto in terms of eort.
6Under the Milwaukee-type program and the simple public-private system, the behavior of the households
and public school are similar. Households observe previous stage public school eort and v (v = 0 in the
public-private system) and decide whether or not to move. The public school moving before the households
correctly anticipates household behavior and makes its rent maximizing eort choice. The public-private
equilibrium is characterized by an eort-peer quality tuple (ePP;bPP), where (i) ePP is an equilibrium of the
stage 1 game, given bPP and (ii) bPP is an equilibrium of the stage 2 game, given ePP. The \voucher shock"
equilibrium is a peer-group quality bV S and an eort eV S such that given voucher v (i) eV S characterizes
the public school equilibrium, given bV S and (ii) bV S characterizes the household equilibrium, given eV S.
3 Characterization of the program equilibria
This section solves for the household and public school equilibria and compares the public school qualities
under the PP, VS, and TOV equilibria. Subsection 3.1 considers household behavior while subsection 3.2
considers public school behavior.
3.1 Household behavior
This subsection analyzes the household behavior under the three systems in a common framework. Under
each of the three systems, households observe public school eort and whether vouchers were imposed
and make their utility maximizing decisions. Each household can either choose to go to the public or to
a private school. In the former case, it gets utility h(y) + u(q(e;b)). In the latter case it gets utility
h(y + v   t  Q   c) + u(Q),17where Q is the optimal private school quality choice of household (y;)
given v, t and c. A household (y;) chooses private school i h(y+v tQ c)+u(Q) > h(y)+u(q(e;b)).
Dene D = [h(y + v   t  Q   c) + u(Q)]   [h(y) + u(q(e;b))]. It can be easily seen that D
y > 0 and
D
 > 0 which imply stratication by income and ability respectively. Since these also hold under v = 0, even
a simple public-private system (without vouchers) is characterized by stratication by income and ability.
Suppose all households expect a peer group quality be 2 [0;1]. I assume that there are always some
households in the public and some households in the private sector for each income level.18 Then for each
17 The parameter v takes on a value of zero under the pre-program public-private system, and under the Florida TOV system
if the public school escapes vouchers. On the other hand, v takes on an exogenously given positive value under the VS program,
and under the TOV program if the public school fails to meet the cuto and vouchers are introduced.
18 This assumption is made for simplicity. All results go through as long as there is at least one income for which this
7y and given t;v;e;c and expected peer group quality be 2 [0;1], there exists a unique household 0 < ^  < 1
such that all households with lower ability choose the public school and those with higher ability choose a
private school. This ^  is the unique solution to the equation:
[h(y + v   t:Q   c) + u(Q)]   [h(y) + u(q(e;be))] = 0 (3.1.1)
where Q is the optimal private school quality choice of the household (y; ^ (y)).19 Since the indirect utility
and the q functions are continuously dierentiable and D > 0, by the implicit function theorem,
^  = ^ (y;v;e;be;t;c) (3:1:1a)
is a continuously dierentiable function.20 Using the implicit function theorem it is straightforward to check
that for each income level, the cuto ability level ^  is decreasing in v and increasing in e, be, t and c.21 Given
all other parameters, the cuto ability level varies inversely with y. This is because both higher income and




















At equilibrium b corroborates the initial conjecture be, that is,
b = be (3.1.3)
In other words, if all households expect a peer-group quality, then at equilibrium this expectation has to be
fullled. Mathematically, given parameters e;v;t;c, a xed point in b is reached.
Proposition 1 A household equilibrium always exists.
All proofs are in appendix A. From (3.1.1)-(3.1.3), the equilibrium peer quality satises the equation b =
g(b;e;v;t;c). The corresponding equilibrium allocation of households between public and private sectors
assumption holds.
19 To save some notation the optimal private school quality choice of the corresponding household is always denoted by Q.
It is obvious that the value of Q will change with income and ability.
20 Similarly, for each  and given t;v;e;c;be there exists a unique household ^ y such that all households with lower in-
come choose public school and those with higher income choose private school. Again using implicit function theorem
^ y = ^ y(;v;e;be;t;c) is a continuously dierentiable function and the cuto income level (for each ability) is decreasing in




























u(Q) u(q) < 0. Superscript Q or q refers to the value of the partial derivative when the household chooses private or
public school respectively.







0 ^ (y;b;:)dy gives the
corresponding number of students in public school at the household equilibrium b. The rest of this section
will explore how changes in the dierent parameters aect equilibrium peer quality, allocation of households
between public and private sectors, and number of public school students. It should, however, be rst pointed
out that while a household equilibrium always exists, it may not be unique. To see this dierentiate (3.1.2)
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be is positive.22 If it exceeds one, there are multiple equilibria. In the presence of multiple
equilibria, one cannot be sure (without a well-specied model of dynamics of adjustment) which equilibirum
will be reached after a small perturbation of a parameter. To avoid these diculties, I henceforth restrict
my attention to parameter values where b(0) > 0 and
g
be < 1. These are sucient conditions that ensure a
unique equilibrium. The rst condition always holds since 0 < ^ (:) < 1. The second condition implies that
a small increase (decrease) in anticipated peer quality leads to a less than proportionate increase (decrease)
in actual peer quality. It holds if the marginal utility from quality ( u
q ) and the marginal responsiveness
of quality to peer quality (
q




are large, a small increase in be leads to a large increase in utility from the public school. This attracts a
substantial number of high-ability households to the public school (that is, it leads to a large outward shift
in ^ (y;:)) so that peer quality increases more than in proportion to anticipated peer quality and there are
multiple equilibria.
Lemma 1 Equilibrium peer group quality falls with vouchers and increases with public school eort.23
An increase in public school eort leads to an inux of higher ability households at each income level, thus
leading to an increase in equilibrium peer quality. On the other hand, vouchers lead to a ight of higher
ability households at each income level, thus decreasing peer quality.
Lemma 2 Vouchers increase sorting by income and ability. An increase in public school eort leads to
reverse sorting by both income and ability.
22 The proof is in appendix A.
23 A similar analysis shows that equilibrium peer quality increases with increases in t and c.
9An increase in public school eort leads to an increase in the equilibrium cuto ability level, ^ (y;b), at
each income level. This occurs through two channels. Given b, an increase in e induces households just
above the cuto at each income level to switch to the public school. This increases peer quality, leading
to a further inux of higher ability households just above the cuto from the private to the public sector.
Vouchers acting directly as well as indirectly through peer quality induce a ight of high ability public school
households at each income level to the private sector at equilibrium (sorting by ability). Symmetrically, an
increase in eort leads to an inux and vouchers a ight of high income households at each ability level.24
Proposition 2 Equilibrium number of public school students decreases with vouchers and increases with
public school eort.
Noting that N(b;e;v;t;c) =
R 1
0 ^ (y;b;:)dy the proof follows directly from the proof of Lemma 2.25 Since
an increase in eort (vouchers) leads to an inux (ight) of households at each income level, equilibrium
number of students26increases (decreases) with eort (vouchers).Note that lemmas 1, 2 and proposition 2
apply to each of the three systems under (PP, VS,TOV) consideration.
3.2 Public School Behavior
The public school correctly anticipates behavior in all the future stages of the corresponding game, and
chooses eort to maximize rent. The rent function27 is given by pN(e;v)   c(N(e;v))   C(e).28 Un-
der the PP system there exists a unique eort ePP such that it solves the rst order condition
R(e;0)
e =
24 An interesting point to note is that the driving force behind sorting here is dierent from that in Epple and Romano (1998).
In Epple and Romano, sorting arises due to an interplay of both demand and supply side factors. Private schools attract high
ability students with tuition discounts while high-income households prefer private schools to public. Here, in keeping with
the feature of the Milwaukee-Cleveland-Florida experiments, private schools are not allowed to discriminate between students.
Rather, they are modeled as passive. Therefore sorting here arises exclusively due to the demand side factor that higher income
and higher ability households have a higher preference towards school quality. A related point to note here is that due to
the absence of the supply side factor (the discriminatory private schools), sorting or \cream skimming" is likely to be less in
these voucher experiments than the traditional voucher experiments (example, Chile) where private schools can choose between
students.
25 It can be easily seen that the cuto ability level (at each income), the cuto income level (at each ability) and the
equilibirium number of public school students increases with increases in t and c.
26 The analysis here assumes that when vouchers are imposed, all households, irrespective of income, become eligible for
them. Although this is the case in Florida, in Milwaukee vouchers are targeted only to the low-income population. I abstract
from this here for simplicity. As appendix B of Chakrabarti (2003a) shows, all results continue to hold under targeted vouchers.
Note that given other parameters (e;v;t;c), the number of students is less in a household equilibrium where all households are
eligible rather than where only the low-income are. The obvious reason is that in the former case there is a ight of households
at each income level, whereas in the latter case it is restricted only to a subset of income levels.
27 I assume juj is suciently high, that is, the rate of fall of marginal utility of quality with quality is suciently large.
This ensures that the revenue function is strictly concave. Since the cost function is strictly convex, the rent function is strictly
concave under this assumption.
28 Note that N depends on other parameters t;c also but they are suppressed to simplify notation.
10(p  cN)Ne(e;0)  Ce(e) = 0. Similarly under the VS program, there exists a unique eort eV S such that it
solves the rst order condition
R(e;v)
e = (p   cN)Ne(e;v)   Ce(e) = 0.
Lemma 3 Vouchers decrease rent.
This lemma is applicable to both the VS and the TOV systems. It says that given other parameter values,
an imposition of vouchers decreases rent. This is because vouchers lead to a loss of students to the public
school. Given that the net marginal revenue is positive, this leads to a decrease in rent.
Proposition 3 Equilibrium public school eort under the \voucher shock" program can be either greater or
less than the pre-program public-private equilibrium.
In the pre-program simple public-private equilibrium, marginal revenue equals marginal cost of eort at
ePP. Vouchers aect both marginal revenue and marginal cost in multiple ways and these eects together
determine whether or not the public school increases eort. More precisely, equilibrium eort increases i
the following expression is positive: [(p   cN)Nev   cNNNvNe] (3.2.1). Vouchers decrease the number
of public school students. Since the cost function is convex in the number of students, vouchers decrease
marginal cost on this account. This is captured by the second term in (3.2.1). The rst term captures the
change in net marginal revenue due to vouchers. Given that net marginal revenue per student (p   cN) is
positive, this depends on the eect of vouchers on the marginal number of students from a unit increase in
















dy. The rst is a direct eect
whereby the marginal number of students that the school can gain with a unit increase in eort falls with
vouchers.29 This is captured by the negative rst term. The second is an indirect eect. Vouchers decrease
peer quality (b

v < 0) which in turn aects the marginal number of students. Since the marginal utility
from school quality decreases with quality (uqq < 0) the marginal number of students due to an increase




eb < 0). Since vouchers lead to a fall in peer
quality, the marginal number of students increases due to this factor (which is captured by the positive
second term). This implies that the marginal number of students and hence net marginal revenue can either
increase or decrease with vouchers, thus rendering the eect on public school eort ambiguous. Public school
eort increases if either net marginal revenue increases or the decrease in marginal revenue is less than the
29 Vouchers lead to an exodus of relatively high-ability households (at each income level) to private schools, so that the new
marginal household (who is indierent between the public and private sectors) has a relatively lower marginal valuation of
quality. Consequently, the number of students gained due to a marginal increase in eort is lower under vouchers.
11decrease in marginal cost. In other words, it increases i the new marginal revenue exceeds the new marginal
cost.
Proposition 4 For each voucher v, there exists a cuto eort level  e30 such that the equilibrium eort31
under the \threat of voucher" program, eTOV exceeds both
(i) the equilibrium eort under the \voucher shock" program, eV S and
(ii) the equilibrium eort under the public-private system, ePP.
The Florida-type TOV program aects public school incentives in a way very dierent from the Milwaukee-
type VS program. A Florida public school facing the threat has two options: it can choose to meet the cuto
or it can choose not to meet the cuto. In the latter case, it is in the same state as its counterpart under
the VS program. It chooses the VS optimum eort eV S and gets the VS rent R(eV S;v). Since vouchers
decrease rent, it follows that the school can be induced to satisfy a cuto  e strictly higher than eV S, where
the rent from  e without vouchers exactly equals the rent from eV S with vouchers. Thus, the fundamental
feature of the TOV that induces a higher eort is that vouchers are not already imposed and a sucient
improvement can enable schools to escape vouchers.32 Note that any cuto in the range (eV S;  e] induces
an eort under the TOV program that is strictly higher than under the VS program. The intuition behind
the second part of the proposition is similar. The Florida TOV program introduces a discontinuity in the
rent function at the cuto eort level. If the cuto is set at eV S, then meeting it gives a higher rent than
choosing to accept vouchers. Since ePP is the rent maximizing eort under v = 0, setting the cuto at ePP
gives an even higher rent to the public school. Given the strict concavity of the rent function, this implies
30 Note that since peer quality is known, announcing a cuto in terms of eort is equivalent to announcing a corresponding
cuto in terms of quality.
31 As appendices B and C show, these results continue to hold when eort is not observable. But, as is obvious, the cuto
can no longer be set in terms of eort, which is now unobservable.
32 The analysis here assumes that all households irrespective of income are eligible for vouchers under the VS program.
However, this result also holds for vouchers targeted to the low-income population under the VS (Chakrabarti 2003a). The
intuition can be laid down in two steps. Call the VS program where all students are eligible the \universal voucher shock"
(UVS) program and where only the low-income students are eligible the \targeted voucher shock" (TVS) program and the
corresponding equilibrium number of students and equilibrium eort NUV S, NTV S and eUV S, eTV S respectively. First, note
that the equilibrium rent under the TVS is greater than that under the UVS. Under the TVS, the school can attract NUV S
students by giving a lower eort than under the UVS (follows from footnote 26 and proposition 2) and hence at a rent higher
than under the UVS. Since the school chooses to attract NTV S, it must be the case that rent is higher under the TVS.
Second, if vouchers when imposed in the Florida-type TOV program took a targeted form, then following the argument in
proposition 4, the program could implement a cuto   e > eTV S. But vouchers take the universal form in Florida, which implies
that the rent would be smaller than the TVS rent if schools failed to meet the cuto. This implies that there exists a cuto
 e >   e > eTV S which satises the school's incentive constraint with equality and hence can be implemented by the TOV
program. To summarize, there are two features in the design of TOV that induce a higher eort than the TVS: (i) vouchers
are not already imposed and (ii) the potential loss of students is much greater.
12that there exists a cuto  e > ePP which satises the school's incentive constraint. Again, any cuto in the
range (e;  e] induces an eort under the TOV program that is strictly higher than under the PP program.
In the TOV program it may be reasonable to think that there is a stigma attached to being labeled as
a `voucher public school'. For example, Maureen Backentoss, assistant superintendent of curriculum and
instruction of Lake County School District refers to it as a \glass of cold water in the face". In the presence
of such a stigma, the public schools gain an additional utility if they are able to escape vouchers. This
feature is absent in the VS program. Note that this will weigh results in favor of the TOV and will induce
an even higher improvement under the TOV.33
Corollary 1 (i) Equilibrium public school quality under the \threat of voucher" equilibrium:34
(a) exceeds the equilibrium quality under the pre-program public-private system.
(b) exceeds the equilibrium quality under the \voucher shock" program.
(ii) Equilibrium public school quality under the \voucher shock" program can be greater or less than the
pre-program public-private equilibrium quality.
From proposition 4, the eort under the TOV program exceeds that under the VS and PP equilibria.
Noting that peer quality varies positively with eort and vouchers tend to lower peer quality, part (i) of
the proposition follows. Since equilibrium eort under the VS program can be greater or less than the
pre-program public-private equilibrium, the same follows for equilibrium quality.35
4 Empirical Strategy
The empirical part of the paper seeks to test the following two predictions obtained from the theoretical
model:
(i) A threatened public school in the Florida-type \threat of voucher" program will respond by increasing
eort, which will result in an increase in its quality.
(ii) Quality improvement of a threatened public school in the Florida-type program will exceed the
improvement (if any) of a treated public school in the Milwaukee-type \voucher shock" program.
33 Another interesting property of the TOV program that is not a part of the VS program is that a mere `threat' of vouchers
(rather than vouchers) can induce an increase in public school eort.
34 An implicit assumption in rest of the paper will be that the Government appropriately designs the program, that is  e lies
within the relevant eort ranges.
35 Note that if equilibrium eort falls with vouchers, quality will be unambiguously less under the VS equilibrium compared
to the PP equilibrium.
13Under the 1999 Florida opportunity scholarship program, if a school gets two failing grades in a period
of four years, all its students become eligible for vouchers. The schools that received an \F" grade in 1999
were directly exposed to the threat of vouchers. These schools will constitute the group of treated schools
and will be referred to as the \F schools" from now on. The schools which got a grade of \D" in 1999 were
closest to the F schools in terms of grade and at the same time were not directly treated by the program.
These schools will constitute the group of control schools and will be referred to as the \D schools". The
treatment and control groups respectively consist of 65 and 457 elementary36 schools. Since the program was
announced in June 1999 and the grades were based on the tests held in February 1999, the classication of
schools into treatment and control groups is made here on the basis of their pre-program scores and grades.
This paper considers public school scores as the outcome variable. The identifying assumption here
is that if the F schools and D schools have similar trends in the pre-program period, any shift of the F
schools compared to the D schools in the post-program period can be attributed to the program. To test
the identifying assumption, I rst run the following xed eects regression (and also the OLS counterpart of
it) using only pre-program data.
sit = fi + 0t + 1(F  t) + Xit + it
where sit is ith school score in year t, fi are school xed eects, t denotes time trend, F is a dummy variable
taking a value of 1 for F schools and 0 for D schools, F  t is an interaction between F dummy and trend,
Xit denotes the set of school characteristics and it is a stochastic error term. 1 captures the pre-program
dierence in trend of the F schools.37
If the F schools and D schools have the same pre-program trend, I use the following set of specications to
investigate whether the F schools demonstrate a higher improvement in test scores compared to the control
D schools in the post-program era. If the treated F schools demonstrate a dierential pre-program trend, in
addition to estimating these specications, I also estimate a slightly modied version of them where I control
for their pre-program dierences in trends. I begin with a completely linear model:
sit = fi + 0t + 1v + 2(F  v) + 3(v  t) + 4(F  v  t) + 5Xit + it (1)
36 I shall restrict my analysis to the elementary schools as there were too few middle and high schools that received a grade
of \F" in 1999 (7 and 5 respectively) to justify analysis.
37 When there are data on more than two pre-program years (as in the case of Florida writing) I also t a non-linear
specication with pre-program year dummies and interactions of F dummy with pre-program year dummies. This allows the
individual F school pre-program year eects to vary in an unrestricted way from those of the D schools.
14where v is the program dummy, v = 1 if year > 1999 and 0 otherwise. The coecient 0 denotes the common
pre-program trend. The variables v and v  t respectively control for post-program common intercept and
trend shifts such as national, state and county level shifts. The coecients on the interaction terms F  v
and F vt estimate the program eects { 2 captures the intercept shift and 4 the trend shift of F schools
compared to the D schools after the program.38 All specications I describe here are xed eects regressions.
I also estimate OLS counterparts of each of these specications.
The second model allows the trend in the comparison group to be non-linear while still constraining the
year-to-year gains of the treated schools in the post-program period to be linear in addition to an intercept
shift.
sit = fi + 99D99 + 00D00 + 01D01 + 02D02 + 0(F  v) + 1(F  v  t) + 2Xit + it (2)
where D99, D00, D01 and D02 are year dummies for 1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002 respectively. 0 and 1
reect the post-program intercept and trend shifts respectively of the F schools after controlling for common
post-program year eects.
Finally, I estimate a completely unrestricted and non-linear model that includes year dummies to control
for common year eects and interactions of post-program year dummies with the F school year dummy to
capture individual post-program year eects.
sit = fi + 99D99 + 00D00 + 01D01 + 02D02 + 0(F  D00) + 1(F  D01) + 2(F  D02) + 3Xit + it
(3)
This specication no longer constrains the post-program year-to-year gains of the F schools to be equal and
allows the program eect to vary across the dierent years. The coecients 0, 1, 2 represent the eect of
one, two and three years into the program respectively for the F schools.
The above specications assume that the D schools are not aected by the program. The D schools do
not face any direct threat from the program. However, since the D schools are close to getting \F", they
may face an indirect threat and hence may be induced to improve. In fact, there is some anecdotal evidence
that D schools may have responded to the program. None of the schools in the Hillsborough County School
District received an F rating in 1999, although 37 schools received a D rating. Hillsborough's superintendent
38 The coecients 2 and 4 represent the program eects under the assumption that D schools do not respond to the
program. If the D schools also respond, 2 and 4 will be underestimates of the program eect.
15announced that he would take a 5% pay cut if any of his schools received an \F" on the next school report
card.39 Similarly, Martin County School District, which had no F school in 1999, announced $1;000 bonus for
teachers at D schools who meet new performance goals. Therefore, I allow the F and D schools to be dierent
treated groups (with varying intensities of treatment) and compare their post-program improvements, if any,
with a suitable control group. The schools which received a \C" grade from the state in 1999, being the
next higher up in the grade scale, constitute my control group here. They will be referred to as the \C
schools" from now on. I estimate the following modied versions of the above specications considering F
and D schools as two treated groups (more treated and less treated respectively) and C schools as the control
group.
sit = fi + 0t + 1v + 2(F  v) + 3(D  v) + 4(v  t) + 5(F  v  t) + 6(D  v  t) + 7Xit + it (10)
sit = fi +
2002 X
i=1999
iDi + 0(F  v) + 1(F  v  t) + 2(D  v) + 3(D  v  t) + 4Xit + it (2
0)






1;i(F  Di) +
2002 X
i=2000
2;i(D  Di) + 3Xit + it (30)
where Di represents year dummies.
I next consider the Milwaukee program. The extent of treatment of the Milwaukee public schools depends
on the percentage of their students eligible for free or reduced price lunches.40 Therefore, I classify the
schools into dierent treatment groups based on their pre-program (1989-90 school year) percentage of free
or reduced-price lunch eligible students. Figure 1 shows the distribution of Milwaukee elementary41 public
schools according to the percentage of their free or reduced-price lunch eligible students in 1990. Since schools
with such population between 47% and 60% clearly form a group with an appreciable number of schools,
they constitute my middle or somewhat treated group. Schools with at least 60% of their students eligible
for free or reduced-price lunch are classied as \more treated" and those below 47% as \less treated". I
shall denote this sample as \60-47". It consists of 42 more treated, 42 somewhat treated, and 21 less treated
schools. In the more treated group an average of 82.9% of students were eligible for free or reduced-price
lunch, 62.9% were black and 14.81% were hispanic. In the somewhat treated group an average of 53.6% were
39 See Innerst (2000).
40 Under the Milwaukee program all households at or below 175 % of the poverty line are eligible to apply for vouchers.
Households at or below 185% of the poverty line are eligible for free or reduced-price lunches. Since the cuto of 175 % is not
strictly enforced and households within this 10% margin are often allowed to apply, the extent of treatment is proxied here by
the percentage of free or reduced-price lunch eligible students of the Milwaukee public schools.
41 The analysis here is restricted to elementary schools only because there are very few middle and high schools in the MPS.
16free or reduced-price lunch eligible, 50.57% were black and 36.8% were hispanic. In the less treated group
an average of 37.17% were free or reduced-price lunch eligible, 45.37% were black and 3.83% were hispanic.
Since it may be interesting to consider a classication where the middle (somewhat treated) group contains
the mean42 and some schools above and below the mean, I construct a second sample, the \66-47" sample.
Here schools with a free or reduced-price lunch population between 47% and 66% form the somewhat treated
group; those with at least 66% such population form the more treated group; those below 47% form the less
treated group. It contains 33 more treated, 53 somewhat treated and 21 less treated schools. Under this
classication, the more treated group has an average of 84.5% free or reduced-price lunch eligible students,
66.5% black, and 18.07% hispanic students. The somewhat treated group has an average of 55.4% free or
reduced-price lunch eligible students, 50.99% black, and 4.09% hispanic students. To test the robustness of
the results, I also consider alternative classications, such as \66" and \60" samples, wherein schools with at
least a 66% (60%) free or reduced-price lunch population are designated as more treated schools, and schools
with free or reduced-price lunch population below 66%(60%) are designated as somewhat treated schools.43
For each of these samples, the control group consists of Wisconsin schools outside Milwaukee which
satised the following criteria in 1990: (i) were urban, (ii) had at least 25% of their population eligible for
free or reduced-price lunch, and (iii) black students constituted at least 15% of the school population44. Since
the Wisconsin schools outside Milwaukee are much more advantaged than the Milwaukee schools, I could
nd only 33 elementary schools which satised these characteristics in 1990. In this untreated comparison
group, an average of 44.95% of the students were eligible for free or reduced-price lunches, 22.37% were
black, and 14.84% were hispanic. Using each of these samples, I investigate how the dierent treatment
groups in Milwaukee responded to the VS program. For this purpose, I rst test the underlying identifying
assumption that the pre-program trends of the untreated and the dierent treatment groups are the same.
Second, I estimate OLS and xed-eects versions of the three specications (1)-(3) after adjusting for the
number of treatment groups.
An alternative way to assess the impact of the program is to consider a continuous treatment variable.
Here the intensity of treatment of schools is proxied by the percentage of their students eligible for free or
reduced-price lunches in 1990. There is a wide variation among Milwaukee schools in the percentage of their
42 The mean percentage of free or reduced-price lunch students in the Milwaukee Public Schools in 1990 was 59%.
43 Apart from these samples, I have also experimented with other samples such as 75-47, 75, and 50 samples which are dened
similarly. The results for these samples are broadly similar to the above four and hence will not be reported here.
44 The control group criteria used here are based on Hoxby (2001).
17free or reduced-price lunch students. In 1990, some schools had as few as 22% of their students eligible for free
or reduced-price lunches, while others had as large as 93% of their students eligible. Exploiting this variation,
I investigate whether an increase in the intensity of treatment is associated with higher improvement (in
terms of intercept, trend, and individual-year shifts) after the program. In this approach the program eect
is assumed to vary linearly with treatment intensity. To relax this assumption, I also estimate models
that contain interactions between treatment intensity and dummy variables representing dierent treatment
groups.
5 Data
The data for this paper come from multiple sources. The Florida data consist of school-level data on test
scores, socio-economic characteristics of schools, and school nance data and are obtained from the Florida
Department of Education (DOE). Socio-economic characteristics include data on ethnicity and sex (1994-
2002)45, percentage of students eligible for free or reduced-price lunches(1997-2002) and are obtained from
the school indicators database of the Florida DOE. School nance data consist of several measures of school
level and district level per pupil expenditures and are obtained from the school indicators database and the
Oce of Funding and Financial reporting, Florida DOE.
School-level data on test scores are available on two tests: (i) the Florida Comprehensive Assessment
Test Sunshine State Standards (FCAT-SSS) (This test will be referred to as the FCAT in the remainder of
the paper.) (ii) the Stanford 9 test which the state calls the FCAT Norm Referenced test (FCAT-NRT).
Following a eld test in 1997,46 the FCAT reading and math tests were administered in the year 1998 in
grades 4, 8, and 10 for reading and grades 5, 8, and 10 for math. Mean scale scores (on a scale of 100-500)
are available for reading (grades 4, 8, and 10) and math (grades 5, 8, and 10) for 1998-2002. The Florida
writing test (known as the Florida Writes test before 2000) was rst administered in spring 1993 in grades 4,
8, and 10. Mean scale scores (on a scale of 1-6) are available for writing in grades 4, 8 and 10 for 1994-2002.
The Stanford 9 test is administered in all grades 3-10 in reading and math only. This test compares the
performance of Florida students with those of students across the nation. This test was rst administered
in 2000, so I do not have any pre-program score for this test. School-level data on mean scale scores (on a
45 For the remainder of this paper, I will refer to school years by the calendar year of the spring semester.
46 The purpose of the 1997 eld test was to evaluate the quality of the test items before they were included on a test on
which students received scores.
18scale of 424-863) and NPR (national percentile rank) scores are available for all grades 3-10 in reading and
math for 2000-02. (The FCAT is a high-stakes test, unlike the Stanford 9, because only the scores from the
former enter the calculation of school grades.)
The Wisconsin data consist of school-level data on test scores, socio-economic characteristics of schools,
and per pupil expenditure (both school-level and district-level data). The data are obtained from the
Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction (DPI), the Milwaukee Public Schools (MPS), and the Common
Core of Data (CCD) of the National Center for Education Statistics. Data on ethnicity, sex, and percentage
of students eligible for free or reduced-price lunches for the period 1989-97 are from the CCD and the MPS.
Data on per pupil expenditure for the same period are available from the Wisconsin DPI and the MPS.
School-level data on test scores are available on two tests: (i) the Third Grade Reading Test [renamed the
Wisconsin Reading Comprehension Test (WRCT) in 1996] and (ii) the Iowa Test of Basic Skills (ITBS).
The WRCT is a state-administered grade 3 reading test that has been administered since 198947. School
scores are reported in three \performance standard categories" for this test: percentage of students below,
percentage of students at, and percentage of students above the standard.48 WRCT data for these three
categories are available for 1989-97. The ITBS reading and math tests were administered by the district
during the period under consideration. Starting with 1994, the ITBS was administered only in math; as
of 1999, the ITBS was no longer administered as a district assessment program. School-level ITBS reading
data are available for 1987-1993; ITBS math data are available for 1987-1997.49
6 Results
The results are arranged in the following order in this section. Subsections 6.1 and 6.2 analyze the program
eects in Florida and Milwaukee respectively. Subsection 6.3 compares the two program eects. Subsection
6.4 discusses the issue of mean-reversion. The last subsection reports other robustness checks.
47 The mode of reporting WRCT scores changed in 1998. The test score data prior to 1998 are not comparable to those for
1998 and after. So I focus on scores up to 1997.
48 Percentage of students below the performance standard, percentage of students at the standard, and percentage of students
above the standard will be denoted by % above, % at, and % below, respectively, in the remainder of the paper.
49 The mode of reporting ITBS math scores changed in 1998. So I focus on pre-1998 scores.
196.1 Florida
Table 1 compares the pre-program trend of the treated F schools with that of the control D schools in reading,
math, and writing. The odd-numbered columns present OLS estimates with standard errors that allow for
correlations within districts. The even-numbered columns present xed-eects estimates. All regressions
are weighted by the number of students tested; present estimates with Huber-White standard errors; and
include ethnicity, sex, percentage of students eligible for free or reduced-price lunches, and real per pupil
expenditure as controls. Although there is no signicant evidence of any dierence in pre-program trend
between the two groups in reading and math, F schools exhibit a signicant negative dierential trend in
writing.
Table 2 presents the eect of the Florida TOV program on F school reading scores as compared to
the D schools. Columns (1) and (2) t the completely linear model 1. After controlling for post-program
common intercept and trend shifts, these columns show evidence of a positive and signicant intercept shift
of F schools after the program. There is also a positive trend shift, but it is no longer signicant in the
xed-eects estimate. Columns (3) and (4) allow the comparison group trend to be non-linear and present
results from model 2. The results are similar and conrm the eects in the rst two columns. These eects
are disaggregated in columns (5) and (6) where the coecients reect the eects of the program after one,
two and three years (model 3). Both the OLS and xed-eects estimates show positive and signicant year
eects in each of the years after implementation.
Table 3 looks at the eect on math and writing scores. Columns (1) and (2) estimate model 1 and show a
positive, signicant, large intercept shift after the program although there is no evidence of any trend shift.
The results from model 2 in the next two columns corroborate this evidence. Columns (5) and (6) (model
3) show evidence of positive signicant F school year eects in each of the three years after the program.
In writing, columns (7) through (10) show evidence of a large, positive and signicant intercept shift, and a
positive, signicant trend shift for the F schools. The last two columns show positive, signicant year eects
in each of the three years after the program.
To summarize, using dierent specications and all three subjects tested (reading, math, and writing),
tables 2 and 3 underline a robust nding in Florida: the treated F schools show considerable improvement
after the program as compared to the D schools. Figure 2 graphs the OLS estimates from the linear model.
It conrms that 1999 has been the watershed year. The F schools improved relative to the D schools after
20the program was implemented, and the gap between F schools and D schools has undoubtedly narrowed.
Since the D schools are close to getting an \F" , they may also face an indirect threat and hence may
be induced to improve. In that case the estimates above will be underestimates. To investigate whether
D schools have also responded to the program, I consider D schools as an additional treatment group.
Designating F schools as the \more treated" group, D schools as the \less treated", and C schools as the
control group, I repeat the above analysis. Tables 4 and 5 present the eects of the program on F and D
schools as compared to the C schools in reading, math, and writing.50 For each subject, the rst two columns
present results from model 10, the last two columns from model 30, and the middle column(s) from model
20. The rst two columns in table 4 show a positive signicant trend shift for both F schools and D schools.
Both treated groups also show a positive intercept shift although it is not signicant for the D schools in the
xed-eects estimate. Also both the F school trend and intercept shifts are considerably larger in magnitude
than those of D schools. The results seem to be robust in that they are reected in columns (3) and (4)
also. Columns (5) and (6) show positive signicant year shifts for both the treated groups in each of the
three years after the program. The F school shifts are larger and signicantly dierent from those of the D
schools.
In table 5, the rst two columns show a positive, signicant intercept shift for F schools in math which
is statistically greater than that of the D schools. Estimation of model 2 in column (3) conrms this result.
Columns (4) and (5) show positive signicant year eects for both F schools and D schools. However the
F school shifts are signicantly higher than those of D schools. In writing, columns (6)-(8) show positive
intercept shifts for both F schools and D schools where the F school shifts are signicantly dierent from
those of D schools. Although there is no evidence of any trend shift for F schools, it is statistically higher
than the negative (though insignicant) trend shift of the D schools. In columns (9)-(10) the F schools show
positive year eects in each of the three years after the program. These shifts are signicantly dierent
from the corresponding D school shifts.51 Again, consistent with the nding in the previous columns, the D
50 F schools exhibit a negative dierential pre-program trend in reading and writing (and no dierential trend in math) as
compared to the C schools. D schools exhibit a negative pre-program trend in reading and positive pre-program trend in math
and writing in comparison to the C schools (Chakrabarti, May 2003). Whenever there is a dierence in pre-program trend, tables
(4) and (5) control for these dierences by including interactions between trend and more treated and less treated dummies
respectively. When there are only two years before program (for example, reading and math), the pre-program dierence
between treatment and control groups can be either a trend dierence or a year eect. In reading and math, specications
1 and 2 control for this pre-program dierence assuming it is a trend dierence, and specication 3 controls for it assuming
this dierence is a year eect. Results from regressions without controlling for these pre-program dierences are qualitatively
similar.
51 In 2002, although the state still continued to grade schools on the scale of \A" through \F", the grading criteria was
21schools only exhibit a positive signicant year eect in the rst year after the program.52
To summarize, the results presented in tables 2-5 seem to be quite robust. Using dierent samples,
dierent subjects, dierent specications, and both OLS and FE estimates of each of the specications, the
results reect the same consistent set of ndings:
(i) F schools have responded to the program. In each of the three subjects tested - reading, math, and
writing - the treated F schools show considerable improvement after the program in comparison to the control
schools.
(ii) The D schools also seem to have responded to the program, which is consistent with the anecdotal
evidence. They show non-negligible improvement (in comparison to the C schools) - at least in reading and
writing.
(iii) The improvement of F schools has been considerably larger and also statistically dierent from those
of D schools. These ndings validate the rst prediction obtained from theory.
These results also shed light on the second question that has motivated this paper. In traditional voucher
experiments, it is very dicult to separately identify the pure public school response to voucher incentives.
This is because the changes reect three simultaneous phenomenon: public school response, change in
composition of students, and change in peer quality. The Florida program provides a unique perspective
to this issue. The F schools face the threat of vouchers and hence respond to incentives. However, if they
succeed in escaping vouchers then there is no sorting or change in peer composition due to vouchers. None
of the 65 F schools got a second \F" during the period 2000-01 and hence satisfy this condition. Therefore
an examination of the F school response to the program promises to give us an idea about the pure public
school response to vouchers. The foregoing analysis reveals that we should expect the public schools to
respond positively to voucher incentives and the magnitude of this response is quite high. Using C schools
as controls and given an in-sample standard deviation of 20 in reading, 20 in math and 0.53 is writing, this
suggests eect sizes of 0.47, 0.50 and 0.80 in reading, 0.45, 0.55 and 0.60 in math and 0.74, 0.70 and 0.64 in
writing after rst, second and third years after the program, respectively.53.
changed to include value added scores in addition to levels. However, since the grades were still based on FCAT (SSS) scores
and the F schools anticipated vouchers if they got a second F in 2002, similar incentives continued to play in 2002. Moreover,
the results are very similar if the year 2002 is dropped and the analysis is repeated with data through 2001 only.
52 It should be noted here that the F schools and D schools (especially, the F schools) received additional funds from the
state. However, all the results above are obtained after controlling for real per pupil expenditure. The results do not change
after controlling for a polynomial in real per pupil expenditure.
53 However, it should be noted that these eects might be overestimates of pure public school response to traditional voucher
experiments. This is because sucient improvement in Florida can enable schools to avoid loss of students altogether. Hence
22Consistent with the above ndings, there is considerable anecdotal evidence that suggest that F schools
have responded to the program. I summarize some of them below. Escambia county implemented a 210-day
extended school year in its F schools (typical duration was 180 days), implemented an extended school day at
least twice a week, added small group tutoring in afternoons and Saturdays and longer time blocks for writing
and math instruction.54 To curb absenteeism it started an automated phone system to contact parents when
a child was absent. Miami Dade County hired 210 additional teachers for its 26 F schools, switched to
phonics, and encouraged parents (many of whom were dropouts) to go back to school for a high school
equivalency diploma. Broward County reduced its class size to 18-20 students in its low performing schools
and beefed up services for children whose main language was not English. Palm Beach County targeted
its fourth grade teachers for coaching and began more frequent and closer observations of teachers in its F
schools. In the words of Carmen Varela-Russo, associate superintendent of technology, strategic planning and
accountability, Broward County Public Schools, \People get lulled into complacency". . .\the possibility of
losing children to private schools or other districts was a strong message to the whole community." (Innerst,
2000).
6.2 Milwaukee
Using the 66-47 sample, table 6 looks at the eect of the Milwaukee \voucher shock" program on WRCT (%
above), WRCT (% below), ITBS reading, and ITBS math scores of dierent treatment groups.55 For each
set the rst column reports results from model 1, the second column from model 2, and the third column
from model 3. All regressions reported in this table include school xed eects56 and control for ethnicity,
sex, percentage of students eligible for free or redued-price lunches, and real per pupil expenditure. Column
(1) nds that after controlling for common post-program trend and intercept shifts there is no statistically
signicant evidence of any trend shift after the program. Although the intercept shifts are positive and non-
negligible in magnitude, they are not statistically signicant. Moreover the intercept shifts are smallest for
the more treated group, which is contrary to what we would expect if they were program eects. Estimates
of model 2 in column (2) corroborate these ndings (except that the more treated intercept shift now exceeds
the Florida program is likely to provide higher incentives than traditional voucher experiments, which are always associated
with some loss of students irrespective of the amount of eort.
54 Innerst (2000).
55 The pre-program trends of the dierent treatment groups are not statistically dierent from those of the control schools
(Chakrabarti, 2003a). Therefore, any post-program shift of the treated schools can be attributed to the program.
56 The results from OLS estimation of the corresponding models are very similar and hence are not reported here.
23the less treated shift although it is still smaller than the corresponding somewhat treated coecient). These
eects are disaggregated in column 3 where the coecients reect the eect of the program after one, two
and three years after the program for the dierent treated groups. Although most of the rst and third year
eects are positive, they are not signicant and do not always have the right hierarchy between groups. The
second year eect, on the other hand, is positive signicant (at least for the more treated and somewhat
treated groups) and quite high in magnitude. Interestingly, the more treated eect exceeds the somewhat
treated eect, which in turn exceeds the less treated eect (although the dierence between the dierent
group eects are never statistically dierent from zero). The results for WRCT (% below) are qualitatively
similar. The second year eect is again statistically signicant for both the more treated and somewhat
treated groups (although the more treated eect is marginally smaller than the somewhat treated eect.)
Since the ITBS was administered in Milwaukee as a district assessment program, I do not have data on
non-Milwaukee Wisconsin schools for this test.57 As a result, my comparison group here will be the less
treated group of schools. Since the comparison group is also treated to some extent, I expect my estimates
for the ITBS to be underestimates. Columns (7)-(9) show no evidence of any statistically signicant eect of
the program on ITBS reading scores of any of the treated groups. However, the eects are always positive,
though the more treated eects are not always greater than the somewhat treated ones. The picture for
ITBS math is broadly similar. However now the second year eect of the somewhat treated group in the
xed-eects estimate is positive, signicant, and exceeds the more treated eect.58 An interesting thing to
note here is that, similar to the ndings for WRCT, the second year eects are the largest and quite high in
magnitude for both ITBS reading and math, although they do not have the right hierarchy and are often not
statistically dierent from zero. Note that none of the more treated eects in this table are ever statistically
dierent from the somewhat treated or less treated eects and none of the somewhat treated eects from the
less treated eects. Figure 3 graphs the OLS estimates for ITBS from the linear model. As expected there
is no evidence of any program eect (MT denotes more treated, ST somewhat treated and LT less treated).
Table 7 considers a continuous treatment variable and proxies the intensity of treatment by the pre-
program (1990) percentage of free-reduced lunch students of schools. Columns (1) and (2) control for
57 Although some other districts in Wisconsin also administered the ITBS, they often used other forms of the test. The
modes of reporting scores were also dierent between dierent districts and hence not comparable.
58 Note that although the more treated school eects are jointly signicant for the WRCT (% above) scores in models 1 and
2 at 10% level, they are no longer jointly signicant either in the non-linear model or for the WRCT (% below) or the ITBS
reading and math scores.
24common post-program trend and intercept shifts and t a completely linear model. There is no evidence
of any improvement with an increase in treatment intensity. Columns (3) and (4) include year dummies to
control for common post-program shocks. The results are very similar to those in the rst two columns.
Columns (5) and (6) disaggregate these eects into individual year eects. Although the OLS estimate of
the second year eect is positive signicant, it is no longer so in the xed-eects estimate and also drops
to less than half the magnitude. The analysis in this table assumes that the treatment eect varies linearly
with treatment intensity. To relax this assumption, I also include interactions of treatment intensity with
dierent treatment groups (results are not reported here as they do not add any new insight), but none of
these coecients are found to be signicantly dierent from zero.
The ndings in tables 6 and 7 can be summarized as follows: The results are mixed. However, it is safe
to say that there is no evidence of any negative eect of the \voucher shock" program. Although most of the
coecients are positive they do not always have the right hierarchy and are often not signicantly dierent
from zero. However, the program seems to have had a positive and signicant eect in the second year after
program, at least in WRCT. These results seem to be robust in that they are replicated in the analysis
with other samples as illustrated in appendix table B.3. Note that these ndings are consistent with the
prediction of the theoretical model (proposition 2).
6.3 Florida Versus Milwaukee
Using the results from subsections 6.1 and 6.2, this subsection compares the eect of the Florida and Milwau-
kee programs on the respective more treated schools. Table B.1 shows that the demographic characteristics
of the more treated and control groups in Florida are very similar to those of the corresponding groups
in Milwaukee (for both the 66-47 and 60-47 samples).59 Table 8 compares the eect of the Florida pro-
gram with that of the Milwaukee program using reading and math scores. The estimates here are based
on those in Tables 4-6 and all gures are expressed in terms of the respective sample standard deviations.
The estimates from the linear model 1 (columns 1-3) show positive, signicant intercept and trend shifts for
the Florida more treated schools and much smaller statistically insignicant eects in Milwaukee. Columns
(4)-(6) report results from the non-linear model. The Florida program has positive signicant year eects
in all the three years after program. In Milwaukee, although most of the year eects are positive, only the
59 For the rest of this section I shall focus on the 66-47 sample in Milwaukee. The results for the other samples are qualitatively
similar.
25second year WRCT eect is statistically signicant{ and each of the Florida eects exceed the corresponding
Milwaukee eects in both WRCT and ITBS. The picture in math in columns (7)-(10) is broadly similar: the
Milwaukee eects are never statistically signicant and are always less than the corresponding statistically
signicant eects in Florida. Moreover using the estimates in Appendix table B.3 it can be easily seen
that these ndings hold for each of the other samples 60-47, 66, and 60 and also for the WRCT (% below
scores).60To summarize, it can be said that the improvement of the threatened schools in Florida program
has been considerably larger than those in Milwaukee.61 This nding is quite robust since it holds for all
the dierent samples, dierent specications, dierent subjects and dierent tests. These ndings validate
the second prediction obtained from theory.
The Milwaukee program saw a major shift in the year 1998-99 and entered into its second phase when
following a Wisconsin Supreme Court ruling, the religious schools were allowed to accept choice students
for the rst time.62 Chakrabarti (2003b) shows that, as a result, the improvement of the treated schools
in Milwaukee Phase II was much higher than that in Phase I. At rst blush, it appears that it would be
instructive to check whether the Florida eects exceed those in Phase II also. Unfortunately, the Florida
program is not directly comparable to the Milwaukee Phase II program. Due to some funding changes the
revenue loss per student is much higher in Phase II than in Florida; the voucher amount is larger; and in
Milwaukee we are many more years into the program (9-12 years) since its inception than in Florida (1-3
years). Since each of these factors are expected to increase the Milwaukee eect, it is not clear that the
Florida eect will still exceed the phase II eect. Nevertheless, Chakrabarti (2003a) compares the eects
of the Florida and the Milwaukee Phase II programs on the respective more treated groups. Interestingly,
the ndings are similar to those above. For each of the samples, each of the specications and each of the
subject areas, the improvement of the Florida threatened schools exceeds that of the more treated schools
in Milwaukee Phase II. This result strengthens the earlier ndings and garners further support in favor of
theoretical prediction 2.
60 The standard deviation for the WRCT(% below) scores is 10.98.
61 Since many of the coecients in Milwaukee are not signicant though positive, I also do a pair-wise non parametric test
(sign test), where I ignore the signicance of coecients and consider only their signs. Under the null of equal eects the
probability that any one eect size in Florida exceeds the corresponding one in Milwaukee is 1
2. Since there are three post-
program years, I have 9 pair-wise comparisons. Under the null, D =Florida eect-Milwaukee eect follows a binomial (9;0:5)
distribution. D is positive in all 9 cases. The probability of getting 9 positive D under the null is 0:002. Since this is very small,
the null of equal eects can be comfortably rejected.
62 This led to more than a three fold increase in the number of private schools participating in the program and almost a
four fold increase in the number of choice students in 1998-99.
266.4 Mean-Reversion
Mean-reversion is the statistical tendency where high or low scoring schools tend to score closer to the mean
subsequently. Since the F schools were low scoring in 1999, a natural question to ask would be whether
the improvement in Florida is driven by mean reversion rather than the program. Since I do a dierence-
in-dierences analysis, my estimates above will be contaminated by mean reversion only if F schools mean
revert to a greater extent than the D schools and/or the C schools.
For a rst pass at the mean-reversion issue, table B.2 investigates whether the schools that were low
scoring in 1998 were also low scoring in 1999. If there were \good" and \bad" schools, which could be
observed with certainty (the \certainty case"), 10% (25%) of the schools will always rank in the bottom 10th
percentile (25th percentile) while if schools were equal and were chosen by lottery (the \lottery" case) only
1% (6.3%) of the schools will rank in the lowest 10% (25%) in both years. The actual percentage of schools
in the last three columns in panels A and B resemble more closely the certainty numbers than the lottery
numbers for each of reading, math, and writing. This implies that although there may be mean-reversion,
it may not be a major problem.
A more direct way to approach mean-reversion is to check by how much the schools that received an \F"
grade in 1998 improved during the period 1998-1999 compared to those that received a \D" (or \C") grade
in 1998. Since there was no program during this period, this gain can be taken to approximate the mean
reversion eect and can be subtracted from the post-program gain of F schools compared to D schools (or
C schools) to get at the mean-reversion corrected program eect.63 The accountability system of assigning
letter grades to schools started in the year 1999.64 However, using the state grading criteria and data on
percentage of students in dierent achievement levels in each of FCAT reading, math and writing,65 I was
able to assign letter grades to schools in 1998. The schools which were assigned grades \F", \D" or \C" in
1998 using this method will henceforth be called the 98F schools, 98D schools, and 98C schools, respectively.
Using data for 1998 and 1999, Panel A of table 9 nds that in comparison to the 98D schools, the 98F
63 This is based on the assumption that the mean reversion of F schools compared to D schools (C schools) of that year
would be similar for 1999 and 2000.
64 The pre-1999 accountability system classied schools into four groups I-IV (I-low, IV-high).
65 In FCAT reading and math, the state categorizes students into ve achievement levels that correspond to specic ranges
on the raw-score scale. Using current year data, the state designates a school an \F" if it is below the minimum criteria in
reading, math and writing, a \D" if it is below the minimum criteria in reading or math or writing, and a \C" if it is above the
minimum criteria in reading, math and writing (but below the higher performing criteria in all three). In reading and math at
least 60% (50%) of the students have to score level 2 (3) and above while in writing at least 50% (67%) have to score 3 and
above to meet the minimum (higher performing) criteria in that respective subject.
27schools show no evidence of mean reversion either in reading or math although there is mean reversion in
writing. In comparison to the 98C schools (Panel B), there is no evidence of any mean reversion in reading;
both 98D schools and 98F schools show comparable amounts of mean reversion in math; and only 98F schools
show mean reversion in writing.
Table 10 presents the mean-reversion corrected eect sizes of the more treated schools for the rst,
second and third years after program. These are obtained by subtracting the eect size attributed to mean
reversion (obtained from expressing the relevant coecients in table 9, panel B in terms of respective standard
deviations) from the F school eect sizes in each of the three years after program.66 The estimates in reading
are the same as earlier. In math, although the eect sizes fall, they are still positive and considerably larger
than those in Milwaukee.67 These results strengthen my earlier ndings and further conrms the empirical
validity of the theoretical predictions (i) and (ii).
Regression Discontinuity Analysis
The whole issue of mean reversion arises here from the concern that the F schools may revert towards the
mean to a greater extent than D schools and/or C schools just by virtue of their relatively low performance
in 1999. Therefore, an alternative way to get around the problem of mean reversion is to do a regression
discontinuity analysis and compare the improvement of F schools just below the cuto between \F" and \D"
with D schools just above the cuto. The Florida program has created a highly non-linear and discontinuous
relationship between school achievement as embodied in 1999 school grade and the probability that the
school's students become eligible for vouchers in the near future. Treatment depends in a deterministic way
on observable 1999 school grade. There exists a sharp cuto { all F schools face a direct threat of vouchers
while the D schools do not face any such direct threat.
To construct discontinuity sample 1, I use the following method to pick F schools and D schools close
to the cuto. First, I rank the F schools based on the sum of the percentage of students below minimum
criteria (level 1) in reading, math, and writing68. Second, I rank the D schools. The D schools which fail the
minimum criteria in maximum number of subjects are considered closest to the F schools69 and D schools
66 Since none of the F schools got an \F" in either 2000 or 2001, the eect sizes attributed to the Florida program in the
second and third years in table 10 may be underestimates.
67 A mean-reversion corrected estimate of Florida versus Milwaukee Phase II also gives similar results (Chakrabarti, 2003a).
68 I choose this method because the school grades are based on this criteria and ranking by this method will, at least to some
extent, resemble/mimic a ranking in terms of grade. The idea is to try to rank the schools in terms of grade.
69 I also use an alternative method where I consider all the D schools as a group and rank them in terms of the sum of
percentage of students below minimum criteria in all three subjects. The results are similar to those from the above sample.
28which fail in only one subject the farthest. Within each subgroup of D schools, I rank the D schools based
on the sum of percentage of students below minimum criteria in all three subjects70. Third, I pick the F
schools and D schools close to the cuto. The F schools thus chosen fail the minimum criteria in all three
subjects while the D schools fail the minimum criteria in at least two and hence the two groups are quite
close to each other. The summary characteristics of the F schools and D schools in this sample are shown
in Table 11. The F schools and D schools in the discontinuity sample are strikingly similar to each other
both in terms of pre-program demographic characteristics and scores and are much closer than the original
sample of all F schools and D schools. Using discontinuity sample 1, and specications (1) and (3), table
12A{Panel A shows that the eect of treatment on reading, math and writing scores are very similar to
those obtained earlier. In fact, in some cases the eects exceed those obtained earlier with the sample of
all F and D schools. Interestingly, the results appear to be comparable or larger in reading and math and
smaller in writing. This is consistent with the earlier nding of mean reversion in writing unlike in reading
and math. Next, I progressively shrink the sample of F schools and D schools and using the above ranks I
pick F and D schools closer and closer to the cuto. Panel B shows the results for the linear model for two
such samples. The results are qualitatively similar.
To check the robustness of the results I use several other methods to pick F schools and D schools close
to the cuto. First, I construct a discontinuity sample (discontinuity sample 4) where both F schools and
D schools fail to meet the minimum criteria in reading and math while in writing only F schools fail the
minimum criteria. Here the probability of treatment varies discontinuously as a function of the percentage
of students scoring above 3 in FCAT writing. There is a sharp cuto at 50%. All schools in this sample
below 50% face a direct threat, while those above 50% face no such direct threat (see footnote 65). The
results from this sample are very similar to those above and are presented in table 12B. I also consider two
corresponding discontinuity samples where both groups fail the minimum criteria in reading and writing
(math and writing). F schools fail the minimum criteria in math (reading) also, unlike D schools. In these
samples, the probability of treatment changes discontinuously as a function of the percentage of students
above level 1 in math (reading)and there is a sharp cuto at 60%. The results are similar and hence are not
reported here.
Second, I consider subject specic regression discontinuity samples. For example to estimate the eect
70 All classications here are based on pre-program (1999) all curriculum school scores. Results are qualitatively similar if
they are based on standard curriculum school scores.
29on reading I consider F schools and D schools such that both failed the minimum criteria in reading. The
underlying argument is that although the F schools and D schools lie on opposite sides of the cuto they
are very similar in terms of their pre-program reading scores { any divergence in their post-program reading
scores can then be attributed to the program rather than mean-reversion. I consider two other corresponding
samples for math and writing respectively.71 For each of these samples and for each subject and specication
the results are similar to those reported above. These imply that the above ndings are reasonably robust.
6.5 Some other issues: testing robustness of the results
Is there a stigma eect of getting the lowest performing grade?
The F schools got the lowest performing grade in 1999. If there is a stigma eect of getting the lowest
performing grade, the F schools will try to improve merely to avoid this stigma rather than in response
to the program. Although the system of assigning letter grades to schools started in 1999, Florida had an
accountability system in the pre-1999 period. Starting in 1997, schools were categorized into four groups
1-4 (1-low, 4-high). Using FCAT writing data72 for two years (1997 and 1998), I investigate whether the
schools, which were categorized in group 1 in 1997, improved in relation to the 1997 group 2 and group 3
schools during the period 1997-98. The rationale here is that if there is a stigma eect of getting the lowest
performing grade, the group 1 schools should improve in comparison to the group 2 and 3 schools even in
the absence of the TOV program. Table 13 shows that there is no evidence that this has been the case.
Has there been \teaching to the test" in Florida?
The above analysis focuses on high stakes test scores in Florida. Since the threat in the Florida program
is given in terms of grade, the response of the Florida threatened schools should be assessed in terms of the
high-stakes test. In other words, the theoretical predictions in Florida pertain to performance in the high
stakes test; the model has no direct prediction relating to the low stakes test scores or \teaching to the test".
The notion here is that if the public school is found to unambiguously respond to the TOV program by
increasing eort, then the other issues of teaching to the test, manipulation of the composition of the test
taking population can be more easily taken care of|for example, by broadening the curriculum to include
all desirable areas and topics and using the test scores of all grades and students (for example, all special
71 Note that the regression discontinuity analysis is likely to produce underestimates since the D schools are treated to some
extent, although indirectly.
72 During this period the local districts used dierent norm referenced tests for reading and math which varied in content
and norms and hence not at all comparable across districts. So I do not use these data for my analysis.
30education and limited english prociency students also) for school grade computation purposes. Moreover,
as Hanushek (2002) argues, \teaching to the test" can only have a one-time eect on school scores.
Nevertheless, I investigate this issue by looking at the reading and math scores from the low stakes
Stanford 9 test, which was not used in the assignment of school grades. While the Stanford 9 test also
contains multiple-choice questions, it places more emphasis on critical analysis in reading and problem-
solving strategies, evaluating expressions, and solving linear equations in math compared to the FCAT.
Table 14 uses data on Stanford 9 test scores for 2000-02. Since this test was rst administered in 2000, no
pre-program data are available. Prior to 2000, the districts used a variety of nationally normed tests which
not only varied in content but the norms were also dierent.73 As a result, these data are not comparable
across districts, years, or with the post-program Stanford 9 data. Therefore, the pre-2000 data are not used
here.
Table 14 panel A shows very high correlation between FCAT and Stanford 9 for both level and change
scores for each of the subject areas tested and for each of the F schools, D schools, C schools, and all schools.
The implication is that the FCAT results should be replicated in Stanford 9 also. Using Stanford 9 scores
for 2000-02, panel B shows that F schools and D schools show positive and signicant improvement in all
grades and subjects and in most cases the F school eect exceeds the corresponding D school eect, even
though the eects are not always statistically dierent between groups. Note that the eects are likely
to be underestimates.74 The overall picture is consistent with the FCAT picture earlier. Up to 2001, the
FCAT reading and math scores only in grades 4 and 5, respectively, were used for school grade computation.
Interestingly, the 2001 F school improvement in reading is largest in grade 4. However for math, the 2001
F school gain is smallest in grade 5. To summarize, from the limited data that are available, the results are
mixed. There is some evidence in favor of \teaching to the test", but there is some evidence to the contrary
also.
7 Conclusion
This paper examines the role of vouchers as instruments of public school reform. It makes several im-
portant contributions in this context. First, it argues that all voucher programs are not created equal {
73 http://www.rn.edu/doe/sas/nrthome
74 Since the Stanford 9 test was rst given in 2000, all these results are relative to the 2000 gains (which from the FCAT
estimates are quite high.)
31dierences in voucher designs aect public school incentives dierently and hence induce dierent responses
from them. Therefore, understanding the eect of dierent voucher designs is essential to the formulation
of eective voucher policies. This study contributes in this direction by comparing the eects of two U.S.
voucher programs { Florida and Milwaukee { that dier fundamentally in their designs. In the context of an
equilibrium theory of public school and household behavior, it argues that the Florida-type program should
bring about an unambiguous improvement in public school performance and this improvement should exceed
the improvement (if any) in the Milwaukee-type program. Using data from Florida and Milwaukee, and a
dierence-in-dierences estimation strategy in trends, it then demonstrates that these ndings are validated
empirically. These ndings are reasonably robust to alternative specications and continue to hold after
adjusting for mean-reversion.
Second, it also has important contributions from a theoretical point of view. It provides micro-foundations
to the public school payo function and derives the demand for public school from equilibrium household
behavior. Moreover, it endogenously determines public school peer group quality at the respective program
equilibria.
Third, empirical quantication, and even determining the direction, of public school response to vouchers
is very dicult because it tends to be confounded with two other eects. Vouchers simultaneously aect
the composition of the student body and peer quality { these too get reected in public school quality or
scores. The Florida program provides a unique case in this respect. In Florida, the schools that received an
\F" grade in 1999 faced the threat of vouchers, and responded to it. However, if they managed to escape
vouchers in the subsequent years of the program, the other two eects were absent. Therefore, the test scores
of these schools provide a good source to assess the public school response.
An interesting direction of future research is to investigate whether these programs also induce public
schools to manipulate the test taking population, or to focus on certain student groups at the expense of
others. It may also be worth exploring the issue of \teaching to the test" in more detail. Understanding
these issues will help design an eective voucher policy. I hope to address these issues in my future work.
Appendix A: Proofs of results
Proof of Proposition 1. This result can be proved in the following steps:
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(ii) ^ 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) is continuous in ^ 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be will be positive. Formally, if for some large y, [^ (y;be;:)   b] < 0, then there must exist some y = y1
such that ^ (y1;be;:) = b. Then,
Z y1
0
(^ (y;be;:)   b)dy > j
Z 1
y1
(^ (y;be;:)   be)dyj )
Z y1
0
(^ (y;be;:)   b):
^ (y1;:)
be dy > j
Z 1
y1











(^ (y;be;:)   b):
^ (y1;:)
be dy > j
Z 1
y1






(^ (y;be;:)   b):
^ (y;:)
be dyj
The last line follows because ^ 
be is positive and is strictly decreasing in y. Therefore
g
be > 0.





































The denominator is positive from uniqueness. Consider the numerator. ^ 









(u(Q) u(q))2 < 0 since hxx < 0, u > 0 and qe > 0. Therefore higher positive values of ^ 
e occur at
lower values of y. Since ^ (y) is inversely related to y, if for some high y, (^ (y;b;:)   b) < 0 then there
must exist some y2 such that ^ (y2;b;:) = b. From the proof of
g
be > 0 above,
R 1
0 (^ (y;b;:)   b)dy > 0.







































e > 0. Therefore b

e > 0.























Consider the numerator. Now, 
2^ 
vy =  hxx
u(Q) u(q) > 0. Therefore due to vouchers, there is a higher fall of
cuto ability towards the lower incomes. Since ^ (y) is inversely related to y, higher positive values of
^ (y;b;:)   b occur at lower incomes. Since ^ 
v < 0, j
R y2



















v < 0. This implies b

v < 0.
Proof of Lemma 2.























34Using lemma 1 and the signs of the partial derivatives, it follows that
^ (y;b
;:)




Symmetric analysis with the income cuto at each ability level shows that
^ y(;b
;:)




Proof of Lemma 3.
Using the rent function,
R(e;v)
v = (p   cN)Nv. By assumption (p   cN) > 0 and from proposition 2,
Nv < 0. Therefore,
R(e;v)
v < 0.
Proof of Proposition 3.
Under the VS program, eV S solves the rst order condition:
R(e;v)
e = (p   cN)Ne(e;v)   Ce(e) = 0.




 [(p   cN)Nev   cNNNvNe]
(p   cN)Nee   cNNN2
e   Cee
A:2
The denominator is negative from the strict concavity of the rent function. Therefore eort increases or
decreases under the voucher shock equilibrium i [(p   cN)Nev   cNNNvNe] > 0. From the strict convexity
























ev < 0. Therefore although the
rst term is negative, the second is positive and Nev ? 0. Therefore A.2 ? 0.
Proof of Proposition 4.
Proof to part (i):
Since pN(eV S;0)   c(N(eV S;0)))   C(eV S) > pN(eV S;v)   c(N(eV S;v))   C(eV S)
By the strict concavity of the rent function, 9  e > eV S that satises the public school's incentive constraint
with equality, pN( e;0)   c(N( e;0))   C( e) = pN(eV S;v)   c(N(eV S;v))   C(eV S).
Proof to part(ii): Facing the TOV program, if public school chooses not to meet the cuto it anticipates
vouchers, chooses the optimal eort eV S and gets rent pN(eV S;v)   c(N(eV S;v))   C(eV S). If it chooses
to meet the cuto, it anticipates rent pN( e;0)   c(N( e;0))   C( e).
pN(ePP;0)   c(N(ePP;0)))   C(ePP) > pN(eV S;0)   c(N(eV S;0)))   C(eV S) > pN(eV S;v)   c(N(eV S;v))   C(eV S)
35The second inequality follows from lemma 3 and the rst because ePP is the rent maximizing eort under
v = 0. Given strict concavity of the rent function, 9  e > ePP such that it satises the public school's
incentive constraint under TOV with equality,
pN( e;0)   c(N( e;0))   C( e) = pN(eV S;v)   c(N(eV S;v))   C(eV S).
Proof of corollary 1.
Proof to part (ia): eTOV > ePP from proposition 4 ) q(eTOV ;b(eTOV ;0)) > q(ePP;b(ePP;0)) since
qe > 0, qb > 0 and b

e > 0.
Proof to part (ib): eTOV > eV S from proposition 4
) q(eTOV ;b(eTOV ;0)) > q(eV S;b(eV S;0)) > q(eV S;b(eV S;v)) since qe;qb > 0 and b

e > 0, b

v < 0.
Proof to part (ii):
eV S ? ePP from proposition 3 ) q(eV S;b(eV S;v)) < q(eV S;b(eV S;0)) ? q(ePP;b(ePP;0)).
Appendix B: Moral hazard problem { unobservable public school
eort
This appendix relaxes the assumption of complete observability of public school eort75 and examines
whether under unobservable public school eort, the equilibrium eort under the TOV program still
exceeds those under the PP and the VS programs. Given public school eort76 e 2 [emin;emax], \eective
eort" e0 is realized according to the distribution F(e0=e), where e0 2 [e0
min;e0
max]. Although e is not
publicly observable, all agents have complete knowledge of the set [emin;emax] and the family of
conditional distributions F(e0=e) for e 2 [emin;emax]. Public school quality (q = q(e0;b)) is a composite of
two factors: (i) \eective eort" e0 and (ii) peer group quality (b) and can be thought of as being embodied
in school scores. All agents observe quality q but not the actual public school eort e that generated it.
The public school chooses eort e to maximize its expected rent. I make the following assumptions on the
distribution function of e0.
A1. For each e 2 [emin;emax], F(e0=e) admits a density f(e0=e) > 0 for all e0 2 [e0
min;e0
max]. The density
f(e0=e) is twice continuously dierentiable with respect to e.
A2. f(e0=e) satises the strict monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP) i.e for all e, ^ e 2 [emin;emax]
75 In practice, public school eort is not observable { what is observable is public school score which is a noisy representation
of public school eort.
76 Public School eort contains unobservable characteristics such as teacher and administrator eort as well as observable
characteristics such as school facilities, class size, experience of teachers, school curriculum, after school programs, special
education, etc. Presence of some unobservable characteristics makes the total e unobservable.
36with e > ^ e, the likelihood ratio
f(e
0=e)




f(e0=e) ) > 0 for
all e0 2 [e0
min;e0
max]. This assumption implies that F(e0=e) is ordered according to rst order stochastic
dominance.
A3. F(e0=e) satises the convexity of the distribution function condition (CDFC) i.e Fee(e0=e) > 0 for all
e0 2 [e0
min;e0
max] and e 2 [emin;emax].77
The simple public-private system, the Milwaukee-type VS program and the Florida-type TOV program are
modeled as follows. The public-private system has two stages. In the rst stage, the public school chooses
eort, which is not observable by the other agents of the economy. Quality q is realized and observed by all
agents in the economy. In stage 2, households choose between schools. The VS program consists of three
stages: In the rst stage, the Government announces the voucher v. In stage 2, facing v, the public school
chooses eort, which is not observable. Quality is realized and observed by all agents in the economy. In
stage 3, households choose between schools. The Florida program is modeled in four stages: In the rst
stage, the Government announces the program and a cuto quality level  q and voucher v. In stage 2, the
public school chooses eort. Quality is realized and observed by all agents in the economy. In stage 3,
government imposes vouchers if q <  q. No voucher is imposed if q   q. In the nal stage, households
choose between schools.
The uncertainty signies the absence of any direct one-to-one relationship between the eort of teachers
and administrators and the realized \eective eort" and hence school scores. Each of the systems consists
of a game between the public school and the households. Facing the program (if any) and correctly
anticipating household behavior corresponding to all e0 realizations (given e), the public school chooses
eort to maximize its expected rent. Eective eort (e0) is realized and given the existing peer quality,78
school quality q = q(e0;b) is simultaneously realized and observed by all agents of the economy. Households
observe this quality79 and knowing existing peer quality deduce the \eective eort" of the school. Based
on e0 and whether vouchers were imposed, households anticipate a certain peer quality and make their
utility maximizing choice. At equilibrium anticipated peer quality equals actual and a corresponding
77 By the MLRP, F(e0=e) decreases in e, CDFC requires that the function decrease at a decreasing rate. Together with the
MLRP, the CDFC captures the idea that increasing eort also increases at a decreasing rate the probability 1   F(e0=e) that
the realization is greater than e0. Thus this is a form of stochastic diminishing returns to scale.
78 The existing peer quality for both the VS and TOV systems can be thought of as the public-private equilibrium peer
quality, since the latter is taken as the pre-program system for both programs. Nevertheless, it is not crucial what the existing
peer quality is, but what is crucial is that all agents have complete knowledge of the existing peer quality.
79 This quality q can be thought of as last year's school scores.
37equilibrium allocation of households between public and private schools is generated. The equilibria are
dened exactly in the same way as earlier. For the sake of simplicity of notation, I still assume that
(ePP;bPP),(eV S;bV S), (eTOV ;bTOV ) represent the equilibria under PP, VS and TOV systems.
7.0.1 Characterization of equilibria
Household behavior: Each household decides whether or not to go to public school based on \eective
eort" e0 and whether vouchers were imposed. A household (y;) chooses private or public school
according as [u(y + v   t:Q   c) + h(Q)]   [u(y) + h(q(e0;b))] is positive or negative. Thus behavior is
basically the same as earlier, the only dierence is that instead of using eort itself, they use a noisy
representation of eort, eective eort e0 to make their school choices. Therefore, all results in the last
section follow through here { equilibrium peer quality, equilibrium cuto ability level at each income and
equilibrium number of public school students increase with e0 and decrease with v.
Public School Behavior






min [pN(e0;v;b;:)   c(N(e0;v;b;:))]f(e0=e)de0   C(e)80 where v = 0 under the public-private
system. Equilibrium public school eort under the VS program can be either greater or less than the PP
system81. The intuition behind this is as follows. With imposition of vouchers, rent decreases at each
realization of e0.82 An increase in e increases the probability of higher e0 realizations. However, the fall in
rent with vouchers can either increase or decrease in e0.83 This implies that vouchers may induce public
schools to correspondingly decrease or increase eort in response to vouchers.
Under the Florida TOV program the public school faces a quality cuto  q or equivalently an \eective
eort" cuto  e0 and chooses e to maximize its expected rent. The school's expected rent under the TOV



















(p cN(:))Ne0(:)F(e0=e)de0 C(e) which is strictly concave since Fee > 0 (CDFC),
Cee > 0.












where (e0;v;:) = [fpN(e0;0;:)   c(N(e0;0;:))g   fpN(e0;v;:)   c(N(e0;v;:))g]. Now,  (e0;v;:) < 0, but it can be either
increasing or decreasing in e0. Therefore, although (e0;ePP) is always increasing and positive i e0 exceeds a certain cuto,
ER(v;:)
e jePP ? 0.
82 Dening r(e0;v;:) = pN(e0;v;:)   c(N(e0;v;:)) for a certain realization e0, rv = r
v = (p   cN(:))Nv(:) < 0
83 re0v = 2r
e0v = (p   cN)Ne0v   cNN(:)Ne0(:)Nv(:) ? 0 since Ne0v ? 0, N0
e > 0, cNN > 0, p   cN > 0








 e0 [pN(e0;0;:)   c(N(e0;0;:)]f(e0=e)de0   C(e). H is
strictly concave in e.84 The following lemma follows from the MLRP.
Lemma 4 There exists ^ e0 2 (e0
min;e0





Proposition 5 For all v, there exists a cuto  e085 such that the equilibrium eort under the TOV program
exceeds those under (i) the public-private system and (ii) the voucher shock program.
This proposition checks whether there exists any cuto  e0 such that the eort (eTOV ) induced by it exceeds
those under the VS and PP equilibria. This is equivalent to nding the optimal contract ( e0;e
TOV ) such
that the cuto  e0 induces the maximum possible eort e
TOV given the public school incentive constraints
and then checking whether e
TOV exceeds eV S and ePP. The PP and the VS scenarios can be incorporated
under the broad cuto design program or TOV program in the following way. If the cuto is set at
 e0 = e0
max the public school realizes that it will always get vouchers irrespective of what eort it chooses.
So this regime is exactly the same as the \voucher shock" regime. The school's best response here is
therefore to choose eV S, the optimum eort under the \voucher shock" regime. Similarly if  e0 = e0
min the
public school realizes that it will never get vouchers no matter what eort it chooses. So this situation is
equivalent to the pre-program public-private scenario and optimum eort of the school is ePP, the
optimum eort under the simple public-private system. This proposition shows that  e0 lies strictly in the
interior of (that is,  e0 6= e0
max and  e0 6= e0
max) which implies that it must be the case that e
TOV > eV S
and e





max] such that if  e0 2 [e0
1;e0
2] then the eort induced by  e0 unambiguously exceeds
eV S and ePP. Dene E1 and E2 such that they respectively solve (e0;eV S) = 0 and (e0;ePP) = 0.
84 Using integration by parts to rewrite H and noting that Cee > 0 and Fee > 0 it can be easily seen that Hee < 0.
85Although the cuto is considered in terms of \eective eort", given the existing peer quality it can be easily translated in
terms of quality.
39Proposition 6 (i)There exists e0
1, e0
min  e0
1 < E1 such that if the cuto  e0 2 [e0
1;e0
max] the eort under
the \threat of voucher" program unambiguously exceeds that under the \voucher shock" program i.e.,
eTOV > eV S.
(ii) There exists e0
2, E2 < e0
2  e0
max such that if the cuto  e0 2 [e0
min;e0
2] the eort under the \threat of
voucher" program unambiguously exceeds that under the pre-program public-private equilibrium i.e.,
eTOV > ePP.
The intuitive argument behind this proposition is as follows. First consider the TOV and the VS programs.
Facing the TOV program, if the school chooses eV S (the equilibrium eort under the VS program), then at
each realization of e0 <  e0, its rent is the same as in the VS program. On the other hand, for each
realization of e0   e0, its rent is higher. Therefore the school chooses an eort strictly higher than eV S to
increase its probability of falling above  e0 since it follows from the MLRP that an increase in eort
increases the probability of higher e0s (lemma 4). The intuition behind  e > ePP is similar. Choosing ePP
under the TOV gives it the same rent as the PP program at each realization above  e0 but lower rent at
each realization below  e0. The school chooses an eort strictly above ePP to increase (decrease) the
probability of realizations above (below)  e0.86 Thus, the results here parallel those in the complete
information model (Proposition 4).
Appendix C: Proofs of Results in Appendix B
Proof of Lemma 4.
By the MLRP, (e0;e) is increasing in e0. Also for any e, F(e0
max=e) = 1. Therefore
Fe(e0





min (e0;e)f(e0=e)de0 = 0. Since (e0;e) is increasing in e0 it follows that there exists
some ^ e0 2 (e0
min;e0
max) such that (e0;e) Q 0 according as e0 Q ^ e0.
Proof of Proposition 5.




















e dq   Ce(e) = 0
86 However, although rent falls at each realization of e0 with vouchers, this fall (or alternatively, the gain in rent from avoiding
vouchers) may either increase or decrease with e0 (re0v ? 0). Depending on this, under certain circumstances, at very low levels
of cuto, the public school eort under TOV may be less than VS and at very high levels of cuto, eort under TOV may be
less than PP. The intuition is as follows. First consider TOV versus VS. If  e0 is low, schools escape vouchers for low values of e0
also. If it is the case that the gain in rent from avoiding vouchers is largest for lower values of e0 then since an increase in eort
decreases the probability of occurrence of lower values of e0, public school may nd it protable not to increase eort. Now
consider TOV versus PP. If  e0 is high, vouchers will be incurred at high values of e0 also. If it is the case that the fall in rent
due to vouchers is highest for high values of e0, then the school may not have an incentive to increase eort since an increase
in eort increases the probability of occurrence of higher e0.
87Since eort improves e0 in the sense of rst order stochastic dominance and [e0 + b(e0)] is increasing in e0 the stochastic
40If L denotes the Lagrangean and ( e0;e
TOV ) solves the above problem then there exists a non-zero
multiplier  such that ( e0;e
TOV ;) solve the following three rst order conditions:
L
  e0 =  
2H






























 e0 r(e0;0)fee(e0=e)e0   Cee(e)] = 0
where r(e0;v) = pN(e0;v)   c(N(e0;v)). The rst two conditions determine  e0 and  e.  is obtained as a
solution to the third equation. Note that setting  e0 = e0
max and  e0 = e0
min is equivalent to the VS and PP
regimes respectively. In the former case, the school gets vouchers always irrespective of the eort chosen, so
this is the same as the VS regime and the school chooses the VS cuto eV S. In the latter case, it never gets
vouchers, so this is equivalent to the PP regime and the school chooses ePP. Therefore if it can be shown
that  e0 6= e0
min and  e0 6= e0
max then it must generate eort eTOV
 > ePP and eTOV
 > eV S.




e < 0 (lemma 4) it follows that 
2H
  e0eje0
min > 0 that is, increasing  e0 above
e0
min increases eort. Therefore e0





max cannot be a solution. Rewriting, 
2H
  e0e = h1( e0;e;v;t;c) = h1( e0;e( e0);v;t;c) = h2( e0;v;t;c).
Since h1 is continuous and the second FOC gives e as a continuous function of  e0, h2 is continuous in  e0.
Therefore it follows that there exists an  e0 2 (e0
min;e0
max) which solves the problem.
Proof of Proposition 6.




















where (e0;v) = [r(e0;0)   r(e0;v)]. From lemma 4, fe(e0=eV S) Q 0 according as e0 Q E1. Now if the cuto
 e0  E1 then H





min (e0;v)fe(e0=eV S)de0 = A1. Although fe(e0=eV S) Q 0 according as e0 Q E1, (e0;v) may be increasing
or decreasing in e0. Therefore A1 ? 0. (Note that A1 7 0 implies ePP 7 eV S).
Case 1: If A1 > 0 then for any  e0 2 (e0
min;E1), H
e jeV S > 0 and eTOV > eV S.
distribution of e0 induced by a higher eort is always preferred to one induced by a lower eort. This implies that this problem
is equivalent to maximizing e subject to the school's incentive constraint.
41Case 2: If A1 < 0 then 9e01 2 (e0
min;E1) such that j
R E1





then for any  e0 2 (e01;E1), H
e jeV S > 0 and eTOV > eV S.
Using cases (1) and (2) dene e0





e0 (e0;v)fe(e0=eV S)de0 > 0]. Then for any
 e0 2 [e0
1;e0
max;], eTOV > eV S. Note that e0
1  e0
min according as A1 7 0.
Proof to part (ii):


















From lemma 4, fe(e0=ePP) Q 0 according as e0 Q E2. Now if the cuto  e0  E2 then H
e jePP > 0 so that





min (e0;v)fe(e0=ePP)de0. Again similarly as
above A2 ? 0. (Note that A2 ? 0 implies ePP ? eV S).
Case 1: If A2 < 0 then for any  e0 2 (E2;e0
max) H
e jePP > 0 and eTOV > ePP.
Case 2: If A2 > 0 then 9e02 2 (E2;e0







then for any  e0 2 (E2;e02), H
e jePP > 0 and eTOV > ePP.
Using cases (1) and (2) dene e0





min  (e0;v)fe(e0=ePP)de0 > 0]. Then for any
 e0 2 [e0
min;e0
2], eTOV > ePP. Note that e0
2  e0
max according as A2 ? 0.
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43Table 1: Pre-program trend of F and D schools - testing the identifying assumptions
Florida FCAT Grade 4 Reading (1998-99), Grade 5 Math (1998-99) and Grade 4 Writing (1994-99)
FCAT Reading FCAT Math FCAT Writing
OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
trend 0.41 -0.05 13.20 13.02 0.20 0.21
(0.56) (0.47) (0.55) (0.61) (0.008) (0.003)
treated * trend -1.78 -2.01 -0.98 -0.72 -0.05 -0.04
(2.47) (1.46) (1.44) (1.48) (0.011) (0.007)
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 1013 1013 1006 1006 2948 2948
R-squared 0.58 0.93 0.59 0.90 0.64 0.80
, , : signicant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively.
Huber-White standard errors are in parenthesis. All regressions are weighted by the number of students
tested. The OLS columns allow for correlations within districts. Controls include race, sex, percentage of
students eligible for free or reduced-price lunches and real per pupil expenditure.Table 2: Eect of \Threatened Status" on FCAT Grade 4 Reading Scores
(Sample of treated F and control D schools in Florida, 1998-2002)
OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE












(1.60) (1.78) (1.65) (1.80)




Treated * Program dummy * trend 1.57
 1.10 1.59
 1.09
(0.74) (1.00) (0.76) (1.00)












Controls N Y N Y N Y
Year dummies N N Y Y Y Y
Observations 2567 2550 2567 2550 2567 2550
R-squared 0.11 0.77 0.11 0.77 0.11 0.77
,
,
: signicant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively.
Huber-White standard errors are in parenthesis. All regressions are weighted by the number of students tested. The
OLS columns allow for correlations within districts. Controls include race, sex, percentage of students eligible for
free or reduced-price lunches and real per pupil expenditure.Table 3: Eect of \Threatened Status" on FCAT Grade 5 Math (1998-2002) and Grade 4 Writing Scores (1994-2002)
(Sample of treated F and control D schools in Florida)
Math Writing
OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE






(0.66) (0.76) (0.01) (0.004)
Program dummy 0.01 0.31 0.11
 0.10

(0.86) (0.91) (0.03) (0.02)









(2.18) (2.29) (2.19) (2.30) (0.09) (0.05) (0.09) (0.05)




(0.72) (0.85) (0.01) (0.01)





* trend (1.06) (1.04) (1.06) (1.06) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)





(1.94) (1.63) (0.08) (0.04)





(2.23) (1.82) (0.08) (0.04)





(3.06) (2.00) (0.06) (0.05)
Year dummies N N Y Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y
Observations 2541 2524 2541 2524 2541 2524 4513 4476 4513 4476 4513 4476
R-squared 0.19 0.76 0.19 0.76 0.19 0.76 0.73 0.84 0.75 0.85 0.75 0.85
p-value
1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
, , : signicant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. 1 p-value of F-test of the program eect on treated schools. Huber-White standard
errors are in parenthesis. All regressions are weighted by the number of students tested. The OLS columns allow for correlations within districts.
Columns (1)-(6) include race, sex, percentage of students eligible for free or reduced-price lunches and real per pupil expenditure as controls. Columns
(7)-(12) include an interaction term of treated dummy with trend and control for race, sex and per pupil expenditure.Table 4: Eect of \Threatened Status" on FCAT Grade 4 Reading Scores { Looking for
Post-Program intercept, trend and non-linear year shifts
(Sample of treated F, D and control C schools in Florida, 1998-2002)
OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE







Program dummy * trend 0.02 0.22
(0.93) (0.48)




(0.84) (1.00) (0.84) (0.99)





(2.04) (2.43) (2.03) (2.44)





(0.81) (0.93) (0.81) (0.93)





(2.47) (2.08) (2.48) (2.09)
























Controls N Y N Y N Y
Year dummies N N Y Y Y Y
Observations 6034 5933 6034 5933 6034 5933
R-squared 0.44 0.86 0.44 0.86 0.44 0.86
p-value
1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
,
,
: signicant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively.
yyy: more treated signicantly dierent from less
treated at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
1 p-value of the F-test for joint signicance of the post-program shifts of the
more treated schools.Huber-White standard errors are in parenthesis. The OLS columns allow for correlations within
districts. Columns (1)-(4) include interactions of trend with more treated and less treated dummies respectively.
Columns (5)-(6) include interactions of D1 dummy (D1 = 1 if year > 1998) with more treated and less treated
dummies respectively. Controls include race, sex, percentage of students eligible for free or reduced-price lunches and
real per pupil expenditure.Table 5: Eect of \Threatened Status" on FCAT Grade 5 Math (1998-2002) and Grade 4 Writing Scores (1994-2002)
(Sample of treated F, D and control C schools in Florida)
Math Writing
OLS FE FE OLS FE OLS FE FE OLS FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Trend 9.82 10.20 0.19 0.19
(0.45) (0.48) (0.004) (0.002)
Program dummy 0.16 0.60 0.03 0.02
(0.86) (0.56) (0.03) (0.01)
Program dummy * trend -7.78 -7.80 -0.09 -0.09
(0.60) (0.53) (0.01) (0.01)
Less treated * program dummy -0.23 -0.15 -0.17 0.08 0.08 0.08
(0.92) (1.09) (1.09) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
More treated * program dummy 9.05yyy 9.02yyy 8.96yyy 0.38yyy 0.37yyy 0.38yyy
(2.13) (2.23) (2.24) (0.09) (0.05) (0.05)
Less treated*program dummy 0.29 0.30 0.49 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03
*trend (0.60) (1.04) (1.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
More treated*program dummy 0.91 0.54 0.50 0.01yyy 0.00y 0.00y
*trend (1.10) (1.01) (1.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Less treated * 1 year after prog 1.06 0.97 0.05 0.05
(0.73) (0.85) (0.02) (0.02)
Less treated * 2 years after prog 2.83 2.54 0.00 0.00
(1.44) (0.94) (0.03) (0.02)
Less treated * 3 years after prog 3.89 3.47 -0.03 -0.03
(1.20) (0.92) (0.04) (0.02)
More treated * 1 year after prog 9.56yyy 8.96yyy 0.40yyy 0.39yyy
(2.02) (1.59) (0.07) (0.04)
More treated * 2 years after prog 11.61yyy 11.00yyy 0.39yy 0.37yy
(2.99) (1.77) (0.07) (0.04)
More treated * 3 years after prog 11.39yyy 11.94yyy 0.42yy 0.39yy
(3.46) (1.95) (0.05) (0.05)
Year dummies N N Y Y Y N N Y Y Y
Observations 6003 5909 5909 6003 5909 10646 10587 10587 10646 10587
R-squared 0.44 0.83 0.83 0.44 0.83 0.72 0.85 0.86 0.74 0.86
p-value1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
, , : signicant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. y,yy,yyy: more treated signicantly dierent from somewhat treated at 10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively.
1 p-value of the F-test of program eect on treated schools. Huber-White standard errors are in parenthesis. The OLS columns allow for correlations within districts. All
regressions are weighted by the number of students tested. Columns (1)-(3) include interaction between trend and less treated dummy, (4)-(5) interaction between D1 dummy
(D1 = 1 if year > 1998) and less treated dummy, (6)-(10) interactions between trend and less treated and more treated dummies respectively. The FE columns include school
xed eects and control for race, sex, percentage of students eligible for free or reduced-price lunches and real per pupil expenditure.Table 6: Eect of \Voucher Shock" on Treatment Status
WRCT Grade 3 Reading % above and % below Scores (1989-1997), ITBS Grade 5 Reading (1987-93) and ITBS Grade 5 Math (1987-97)
WRCT (% above) WRCT (% below) ITBS Reading ITBS Math
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Less treated * program dummy 3.45 2.01 -2.02 -0.15
(2.98) (3.01) (2.25) (2.30)
Somewhat treated*program dummy 3.50 3.17 -3.72 -2.87 3.57 3.61 0.39 0.63
(2.59) (2.50) (1.94) (1.91) (5.24) (5.22) (2.81) (2.82)
More treated * program dummy 2.85 2.74 -1.60 -1.67 1.61 1.86 -2.97 -2.16
(3.32) (3.15) (2.56) (2.50) (4.98) (5.01) (3.13) (3.22)
Less treated*program dummy*trend 0.26 -0.57 0.00 -0.11
(0.53) (0.51) (0.38) (0.37)
Somewhat treated*program dummy 0.64 0.70 -0.26 -0.33 1.34 1.34 0.61 0.54
*trend (0.47) (0.44) (0.34) (0.33) (1.94) (1.96) (0.54) (0.56)
More treated*program dummy*trend 0.67 0.92 0.14 0.05 1.47 1.45 0.50 0.55
(0.62) (0.58) (0.46) (0.46) (2.31) (3.30) (0.63) (0.71)
Less treated * 1 year after program 3.28 0.94
(3.19) (2.06)
Less treated * 2 years after program 3.51 -0.79
(2.67) (1.85)
Less treated * 3 years after program 4.25 0.86
(3.74) (2.52)
Somewhat treated * 1 year after program 2.03 -0.54 4.15 -1.35
(2.81) (2.05) (4.49) (2.94)
Somewhat treated * 2 years after program 5.38 -4.45 7.83 6.14
(2.43) (1.88) (5.17) (3.38)
Somewhat treated * 3 years after program 5.01 -2.60 6.78 2.47
(3.03) (2.30) (5.31) (3.31)
More treated * 1 year after program -0.92 1.55 1.12 -4.02
(3.33) (2.50) (3.86) (3.26)
More treated * 2 years after program 6.06 -4.16 6.59 4.36
(3.14) (2.50) (5.15) (3.83)
More treated * 3 years after program 5.69 0.38 2.85 -2.22
(3.98) (3.16) (5.18) (3.54)
Year dummies N Y Y N Y Y N Y Y N Y Y
Observations 1195 1195 1195 1195 1195 1195 717 717 717 1127 1127 1127
R-squared 0.50 0.57 0.58 0.47 0.52 0.52 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.58 0.59 0.60
p-value1 0.06 0.06 0.11 0.82 0.75 0.11 0.67 0.67 0.62 0.49 0.76 0.27
, , : signicant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. 1 p-value of the F-test of joint signicance of more treated shift coecients. Huber-White standard
errors are in parenthesis. This table uses the 66-47 sample. All regressions include school xed eects and control for ethnicity, sex, percentage of students eligible for
free or reduced-price lunches and real per pupil expenditure.Table 7: Eect of Milwaukee \Voucher Shock" Program using a continuous treatment
variable
(Sample of Milwaukee Public Schools)
Dependent variable: Grade 3 WRCT reading (% above) Scores
OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE





Program dummy -1.68 -0.08
(5.49) (4.61)
Treatment * Program dummy 0.11 0.09 0.11 0.01
(0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09)




Treatment * Program dummy * trend 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Treatment * 1 year after program 0.00 -0.09
(0.09) (0.09)
Treatment * 2 years after program 0.19
 0.07
(0.09) (0.09)
Treatment * 3 years after program 0.14 0.03
(0.12) (0.11)
Controls N Y N Y N Y
Year dummies N N N N Y Y
Observations 920 920 920 920 920 920
R-squared 0.12 0.47 0.20 0.55 0.20 0.55
,
,
: signicant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively.
Huber-White standard errors are in parenthesis. Controls include race, sex and percentage of students eligible for
free or reduced-price lunches.Table 8: Comparing the impact of the Florida \threat of voucher" program and the Milwaukee \voucher shock" program
Using performance in reading test [WRCT (% above) 1989-97 and FCAT Reading 1998-2002] and math test [ITBS Math 1986-97 and FCAT Math
1998-2002]
Reading Math
Milwaukee Florida Milwaukee Florida Milwaukee Florida Milwaukee Florida
WRCT ITBS FCAT WRCT ITBS FCAT ITBS FCAT ITBS FCAT
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
More Treated * Program dummy 0.18 0.09 0.25
 -0.18 0.45

More Treated * Program dummy * trend 0.04 0.08 0.40
 0.03 0.03
More Treated * 1 year after prog -0.06 0.06 0.47
 -0.24 0.45





More treated * 3 years after prog 0.35 0.15 0.80
 -0.13 0.60

trend Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes No No
Post-program common trend Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes No No
& intercept shifts
Year dummies No No No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
,
,
: signicant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. All gures are in terms of respective sample standard deviations. This table uses the
66-47 sample for Milwaukee. All gures are obtained from regressions that contain ethnicity, sex, percentage of students eligible for free or reduced-price
lunches and real per pupil expenditure as control variables. Standard deviation of FCAT reading scores = 20, Standard deviation of FCAT math scores
= 20, Standard deviation of WRCT (% above) reading scores = 16, Standard deviation of ITBS reading scores = 18.45, Standard deviation of ITBS
math scores = 16.71Table 9: Mean Reversion of the 98F schools compared to 98D and 98C schools, 1998-1999.
Panel A: 98F and 98D Schools Dependent Variable: FCAT Score, 1998-99.
Reading Math Writing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)








(0.67) (0.43) (0.65) (0.49) (0.01) (0.01)
98F*trend -0.45 -0.65 1.03 1.17 0.14
 0.14

(1.77) (1.14) (1.81) (1.19) (0.03) (0.02)
Observations 1353 1353 1354 1354 1355 1355
R
2 0.64 0.93 0.63 0.91 0.33 0.85
Panel B: 98F, 98D and 98C Schools Dependent Variable: FCAT Score, 1998-99.
Reading Math Writing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)








(0.56) (0.35) (0.50) (0.36) (0.01) (0.01)





(1.78) (1.12) (1.80) (1.16) (0.03) (0.02)
98D*trend 0.41 0.16 4.61
 4.22
 0.01 0.01
(0.88) (0.54) (0.82) (0.58) (0.02) (0.01)
Observations 2605 2605 2608 2608 2608 2608
R
2 0.76 0.96 0.76 0.94 0.38 0.87
,
,
: signicant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. Huber-White standard errors are in parenthesis.
All regressions include race, sex, percentage of students eligible for free or reduced-price lunches and per pupil
expenditure as controls. Sample of 98F and 98D schools: s.d of FCAT reading, math and writing respectively are
18.9, 18.05, 0.30. Sample of 98F, 98D, 98C schools: s.d of FCAT reading, math and writing respectively are 21.16,
21.56 and 0.31.Table 10: Comparing the impact of the Florida threat of voucher program and Milwaukee voucher shock
program, after correcting for mean reversion
Using performance in reading test [WRCT (% above) 1989-97 and FCAT Reading 1998-2002] and math test [ITBS Math 1986-1997
and FCAT Math 1998-2002]
Corrected for Mean Reversion
Reading Math Reading Math
Wisconsin Florida Wisconsin Florida Wisconsin Florida Wisconsin Florida
WRCT FCAT ITBS FCAT WRCT FCAT ITBS FCAT
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

















Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
All gures are in terms of respective sample standard deviations. The insignicant coecients are reported as zero standard deviation.
All gures are obtained from regressions that contain ethnicity, sex, percentage of students eligible for free or reduced-price lunches
and real per pupil expenditure as control variables.Table 11: Pre-program summary characteristics of F and D Schools in Florida, 1999
Sample of all F and D Schools Discontinuity Sample 1
F D F-D F D F-D
(std. dev.) (std.dev.) [p-value] (std. dev.) (std.dev.) [p-value]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
% black 62.79 46.56 16.23 57.97 56.36 1.60
(28.23) (30.98) [0.00] (29.45) (30.02) [0.77]
% hispanic 18.95 19.31 -0.37 17.61 18.95 -1.34
(23.40) (24.10) [0.91] (24.22) (22.56) [0.74]
% white 17.18 32.20 -15.02 23.18 23.11 0.06
(19.55) (28.21) [0.00] (21.34) (25.28) [0.99]
%asian 0.61 1.19 -0.58 0.73 0.99 -0.25
(1.19) (2.39) [0.05] (1.25) (2.48) [0.54]
% american indian 0.22 0.25 -0.03 0.27 0.24 0.03
(0.59) (0.75) [0.73] (0.68) (0.80) [0.83]
%male 51.38 51.07 -0.32 0.73 0.99 -0.25
(4.84) (5.86) [0.68] (1.25) (2.48) [0.54]
% free-reduced lunch 85.80 74.78 -11.02 83.97 81.46 2.51
(9.95) (16.39) [0.00] (8.39) (12.47) [0.23]
FCAT Reading Score 253.55 272.34 -18.79 263.17 262.94 0.23
(17.68) (17.12) [0.00] (12.04) (15.37) [0.93]
# tested in Reading 87.51 90.18 -2.67 90.13 89.65 0.48
(29.37) (40.86) [0.61] (32.43) (38.45) [0.94]
FCAT Math Score 274.31 290.30 -15.99 281.64 282.65 -1.01
(13.99) (14.86) [0.00] (9.09) (12.69) [0.64]
# tested in Math 82.66 86.41 -3.75 85.97 85.18 0.79
(25.94) (39.57) [0.46] (30.14) (37.60) [0.90]
FCAT Writing Score 2.45 2.85 -0.40 2.51 2.72 -0.21
(0.17) (0.27) [0.00] (0.14) (0.20) [0.00]
# tested in Writing 89.09 90.42 -1.33 92.26 90.28 1.98
29.61 (40.89) [0.80] (32.48) (38.38) [0.77]
# of Schools 65 457 39 173Table 12A: Regression Discontinuity Analysis in Florida
Eect of \Threatened Status" on FCAT Grade 4 Reading (1998-2002), Writing (1994-2002) and
grade 5 Math (1998-2002) Scores
Panel A Reading Math Writing
Discontinuity Sample 1 FE FE FE FE FE FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
trend -0.56 12.91 0.20
(1.10) (1.22) (0.01)
Program dummy -6.47 -2.03 0.16
(1.42) (1.65) (0.03)
Program dummy * trend 6.74 -8.91 -0.12
(1.26) (1.39) (0.01)
Treated*Program dummy 4.05 10.29 0.17
(2.16) (3.06) (0.07)
Treated*Program dummy*trend 0.75 -1.65 0.05
(1.40) (1.43) (0.03)
Treated*1 year after program 4.76 8.64 0.23
(2.23) (2.15) (0.05)
Treated*2 years after program 2.55 (6.83) 0.25
(2.21) (2.51) (0.05)
Treated*3 years after program 6.31 5.33 0.34
(2.52) (2.80) (0.06)
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 1043 1043 1033 1033 1847 1847
R-squared 0.70 0.62 0.67 0.68 0.84 0.85
p-value 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Panel B Discontinuity Sample 2 Discontinuity Sample 3
Reading Math Writing Reading Math Writing
FE FE FE FE FE FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treated * Program dummy 5.84 10.92 0.16 6.65 10.09 0.16
(3.52) (3.81) (0.08) (4.00) (4.56) (0.09)
Treated * Program dummy -0.83 0.12 0.06 -1.65 2.66 (0.04)
* trend (1.70) (1.76) (0.04) (4.11) (1.90) (0.04)
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 563 573 1016 341 331 613
R-squared 0.79 0.75 0.85 0.78 0.72 0.84
p-value 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00
# of F Schools 27 27 27 21 21 21
(% in group) (40) (40) (40) (20) (20) (20)
# of D Schools 90 90 90 47 47 47
(% in group) (20) (20) (20) (10) (10) (10)
, , : signicant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. Huber-White standard errors are in parenthesis. All
regressions are weighted by the number of students tested. The writing columns control for pre-program dierences in trend
or year eects of treated schools. All regressions include school xed eects. Controls include race, sex, percentage of students
eligible for free or reduced-price lunches and real per pupil expenditure. All columns in Panel B include trend, program dummy





Treated * 1 year after Program 4.21 8.03 0.19
(2.46) (2.58) (0.06)
Treated * 2 years after Program 3.45 7.12 0.12
(2.71) (3.04) (0.06)
Treated * 3 years after Program 7.47 6.49 0.20
(3.06) (3.26) (0.08)
Controls Y Y Y
Observations 513 505 909
R-squared 0.76 0.76 0.87
p-value 0.01 0.00 0.00
, ,  denote signicance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. The table uses sample of F and D schools where
both groups fail to achieve the minimum criteria in both reading and mathematics - in addition, the F schools, but not the D
schools, fail to achieve the minimum criterion in writing.Table 13. Is there a stigma eect of getting the lowest performing grade?
Eect of being categorized in group 1 on FCAT Writing Scores
Using FCAT Writing Scores, 1997-1998
Sample of Group 1 and 2 Schools Sample of Group 1, 2 and 3 Schools
OLS FE FE OLS FE FE








(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Group 1*trend -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02
(0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05)
Group2*trend 0.03 0.04 0.04
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Controls N N Y N N Y
Observations 314 314 314 1361 1361 1358
R-squared 0.49 0.84 0.85 0.52 0.87 0.87
,
,
: signicant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. Huber-White standard errors are in parenthe-
sis. Controls include race, sex, percentage of students eligible for free or reduced-price lunches and real per pupil
expenditure.Table 14: Has there been \teaching to the test" in Florida?
Panel A Correlation between FCAT and Stanford 9 NPR Scores
All Schools F Schools D Schools C Schools
Grade 4 Reading, 2000 0.94 0.85 0.87 0.85
(1603) (65) (453) (695)
Grade 4 Reading, 2001 0.96 0.81 0.91 0.92
(1651) (64) (451) (694)
Grade 4 Reading, 2002 0.95 0.85 0.88 0.91
(1694) (63) (451) (694)
Grade 5 Math, 2000 0.93 0.81 0.85 0.84
(1599) (65) (452) (694)
Grade 5 Math, 2001 0.95 0.89 0.91 0.91
(1650) (64) (448) (692)
Grade 5 Math, 2002 0.95 0.85 0.90 0.92
(1699) (63) (447) (694)
Change in Grade 4 Reading, 2001-00 0.92 0.91 0.91 0.92
Change in Grade 4 Reading, 2002-01 0.94 0.92 0.93 0.95
Change in Grade 5 Math, 2001-00 0.93 0.93 0.92 0.92
Change in Grade 5 Math, 2002-01 0.95 0.94 0.94 0.94
Panel B Dependent Variable = Stanford 9 NPR Scores
Reading Math
Grade 3 Grade 4 Grade 5 Grade 3 Grade 4 Grade 5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)







(0.83) (0.82) (0.71) (1.00) (1.01) (1.08)







(0.91) (0.89) (0.72) (1.12) (1.09) (1.10)







(0.42) (0.41) (0.39) (0.48) (0.44) (0.49)






(0.44) (0.43) (0.42) (0.52) (0.47) (0.50)
Observations 3546 3545 3530 3546 3544 3530
R
2 0.91 0.91 0.93 0.90 0.92 0.89
p-value 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02
Panel 1: All correlations in are signicantly dierent from zero at the 1% level. The number of schools in
the corresponding category are in parentheses.
Panel 2: , , : signicant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. 1p-value of the F-test for joint
signicance of post-program more treated year eects. Huber-White standard errors are in parenthesis. All
regressions are weighted by the number of students tested and include school xed eects ethnicity, sex,
percentage of students eligible for free or reduced-price lunches and real per pupil expenditure.Table B.1: Pre-program demographic characteristics of more treated schools and control schools in
Florida and Wisconsin
Panel A Florida Wisconsin Florida{Wisconsin
66-47 60-47 66-47 60-47
More treated Schools (std. dev.) (std.dev.) (std.dev.) [p-value] [p-value]
% black 62.79 66.55 62.90 -3.76 -0.10
(28.23) (32.22) (29.58) [0.56] [0.99]
% hispanic 18.95 18.07 14.81 0.88 4.14
(23.40) (24.54) (21.86) [0.87] [0.36]
% white 17.18 10.21 17.38 6.97 -0.20
(19.54) (10.68) (16.55) [0.07] [0.96]
%male 51.38 52.25 52.33 -0.87 -0.95
(4.84) (2.60) (2.58) [0.34] [0.22]
% free-reduced lunch 85.80 84.5 82.9 1.3 2.9
(9.95) (6.48) (9.04) [0.50] [0.12]
Panel B Florida Wisconsin Florida{Wisconsin
Control Schools (std.dev.) (std. dev.) [p-value]
% black 18.12 22.37 -4.25
(14.17) (12.93) [0.10]
% hispanic 15.49 14.84 0.17
(21.23) (6.02) [0.86]
% white 63.59 60.85 2.73
(22.33) (12.80) [0.49]
% male 51.38 50.63 0.76
(4.84) (2.29) [0.43]
% free-reduced lunch 50.14 44.95 5.19
(17.51) (11.66) [0.10]
Table B.2: Percent of Schools in Bottom 10th and 25th Percentile in FCAT in 1998 & 1999
Panel A: # of years % of Schools in Bottom 10th percentile
during 1998 & 1999 Certainty Case Lottery Case Reading Math Writing
2 years 10 1 7.2 7 7
1 year 0 18 6.1 6.7 10.1
Never 90 81 86.7 86.3 82.9
Panel B: # of years % of Schools in Bottom 25th percentile
during 1998 & 1999 Certainty Case Lottery Case Reading Math Writing
2 years 25 6.3 20.4 19.1 18.5
1 year 0 37.5 10.1 13.3 20.1
Never 75 56.3 69.5 67.6 61.4Table B.3: Eect of the \Voucher Shock" program on treatment status
Checking robustness using dierent samples
(WRCT % above and % below scores, 1989-1997)
WRCT % above WRCT % below
66-47 60-47 66 60 66-47 60-47 66 60
FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Less treated * 1 year after program 3.28 2.55 0.94 1.53
(3.19) (3.20) (2.06) (2.45)
Less treated * 2 years after program 3.51 2.81 -0.79 -1.31
(2.67) (2.67) (1.85) (2.16)
Less treated * 3 years after program 4.25 3.24 0.86 -0.09
(3.74) (3.75) (2.52) (2.98)
Somewhat treated * 1 year after program 2.03 0.90 2.64 1.56 -0.54 1.29 -0.26 1.09
(2.81) (3.02) (2.63) (2.75) (2.05) (2.24) (1.94) (2.04)









(2.43) (2.64) (2.25) (2.36) (1.88) (2.08) (1.78) (1.87)






(3.03) (3.21) (2.90) (3.01) (2.30) (2.49) (2.36) (2.38)
More treated * 1 year after program -0.92 -0.72 -0.90 0.76 1.55 0.52 2.35 0.47
(3.33) (2.93) (3.32) (2.92) (2.50) (2.16) (2.47) (2.15)









(3.14) (2.68) (3.12) (2.68) (2.50) (2.13) (2.48) (2.12)
More treated * 3 years after program 5.69 5.52 5.73 5.60 0.38 -0.51 -0.47 -0.62
(3.98) (3.47) (3.97) (3.46) (3.16) (3.16) (3.15) (2.84)
Observations 1195 1195 1195 1195 1195 1195 1195 1195
R-squared 0.58 0.58 0.57 0.57 0.53 0.52 0.52 0.52
,
,
: signicant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively.
y,
yy,
yyy: more treated signicantly dierent from less treated at 10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively.
z,
zz,
zzz: more treated signicantly dierent from somewhat treated at 10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively.
+,
++,
+++: somewhat treated signicantly dierent from less treated at 10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively.
Huber-White standard errors are in parenthesis. All columns include school xed eects, year dummies and control for ethnicity,












































 FCAT  Reading, Math and Writing-F,D Schools
Figure 2. Florida 'threat of voucher' Program
FCAT reading -- F and D Schools
YEAR
 F1  D1






FCAT math -- F and D Schools
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FCAT writing -- F and D Schools
year
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ITBS Reading and Math --MT, ST and LT 
Figure 3. Milwaukee Voucher Shock Program 
ITBS Reading 
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